William & Mary Law Review
Volume 19 (1977-1978)
Issue 3

Article 3

March 1978

Processing the Explosion in Title VII Class Action Suits: Achieving
Increased Compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)
Earle K. Shawe

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons

Repository Citation
Earle K. Shawe, Processing the Explosion in Title VII Class Action Suits: Achieving Increased
Compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), 19 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 469 (1978),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol19/iss3/3
Copyright c 1978 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

PROCESSING THE EXPLOSION IN TITLE VII CLASS
ACTION SUITS: ACHIEVING INCREASED
COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 23(a)
EARLE

K. SHAWE*

Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains four
prerequisites to class action lawsuits. The rule provides that one or
more members of a class may sue as a class representative if:
(1)the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.'
Judicial opinions have adopted the following shorthand to summarize these requirements: (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation.2 When a class action is
initiated a federal court must measure the claims of the representative plaintiff against these requirements and must deny class certifi-3
cation to the suit unless the plaintiff satisfies each facet of the rule .
In class action suits alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,1 the Act's optimistically broad goal of eliminating all vestiges of employment discrimination' often conflicts with
Rule 23's policy of protecting unrepresented, unnamed persons
against potentially unfair res judicata consequences.' Efforts to re* LL.B., University of Virginia. Senior Partner, Shawe & Rosenthal, Baltimore, Md. Former Co-Chairman, Labor Law Section, Committee on Practice and Procedure of the American Bar Association. A specialist in labor relations law, the author's firm represents a large
number of corporate clients engaged in class action litigation brought under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The author particularly wishes to thank Patrick M. Pilachowski, as well as Leslie R.
Stellman, associates in the firm of Shawe & Rosenthal, for their assistance in the preparation
of this Article.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)-(4). See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 1762-1765 (1972). In addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a), the
action must satisfy Rule 23(b). FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). See notes 110-16 infra & accompanying
text.
2. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 1, §§ 1762-1765.
3. See id. § 1765.
4. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1974 & Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Title VII].
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, national origin,
or religion. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1974).
5. See 4 H. NEWBERO, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 7973a (1977).
6. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated and re-
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solve the inherent conflict between these two policies have been
stymied by the typical ad hoc determination of Title VII class status.7 Consequently, interpretations of Rule 23(a) in Title VII class
actions have not been uniform 8 and offer little guidance to the proper application of Rule 23(a)'s requirements to such actions
Faced with this conflict, many courts have relaxed the procedural
requirements of Rule 23(a) to facilitate redress of Title VII violations.1 As the courts recognized the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's shortcomings in enforcing the Civil Rights Act"
manded on othergrounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) ("[C]ourts have expressed particular concern
for the adequacy of representation in a class suit because the judgment conclusively determines the rights of absent class members."); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74
F.R.D. 24, 42 (N.D. Cal. 1977); 7 C. WmGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 1, § 1762, at 595; §
1765, at 617; § 1771, at 665 n.62.
Class members are not the only group whose interests are protected by Rule 23. If the class
representative adequately represents the class, other class members will be bound by res
judicata and thus will be precluded from bringing subsequent suits alleging that the employer's policies are discriminatory. See, e.g., Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 345
(E.D. Va. 1976); Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62, 68 (D.D.C. 1972). Thus, defendants
also may benefit from class action designation: if the defendant prevails in a class action suit,
he is insulated from further suits alleging the same discriminatory practices, but in the
absence of class action designation, he may be subject to innumerable suits predicated on
the same allegedly discriminatory policies. See Comment, To What Extent Can a Court
Remedy Classwide Discriminationin an Individual Suit Under Title VII?, 20 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 388, 390 & n.17 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Classwide Discrimination].
7. Note, Representative PartyNeed Only Show Sufficient Nexus with Class for Title VII
Class Actions to Continue, 10 U. RICH. L. REv. 394, 401 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Representative Party]. See also Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 DuKE L.J. 573, 575.
8. See Classwide Distrimination,supra note 6, at 407.
9. See Representative Party, supra note 8, at 401.
10. Employment discrimination suits generally have received more liberal treatment than
other types of class actions. See Comment, The Class Action and Title VII-An Overview,
10 U. RICH. L. REv. 325, 326 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Class Action]. See also 4 H.
NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 7984, at 1302; 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE 23.10-1 (2d ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as MooiE's]; 7 C. WmGHT & A.MnuR, supra note 1, § 1771, at 662-63.
Although a complaint in an employment discrimination suit may be phrased in personal
terms, "if the relief requested is applicable to a class and is requested for such class, the court
will look beyond the individual claims to determine if the suit involves an overall attack on
forbidden discrimination." Comment, Class Actions and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964: The Proper Class Representative and the Class Remedy, 47 TuL. L. REv. 1005, 1008
(1973). Despite the liberal treatment accorded employment discrimination suits, no court has
explicitly excused the representative plaintiff from proving that all the requirements of Rule
23 are satisfied. Janofsky, Class Actions Under Title VII, 27 LAB. L.J. 323 (1976).
11. See 4 H. NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 7973a, at 1268. The EEOC recently has been
subjected to extensive congressional criticism. See HousE SUBCOMM. ON EQUAL OPPoRTuNrrIEs,
STAFF REPORT ON OVERSIGHT INVESTIGATION OF FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY LAWS, H.R. Doc. No. 342-1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976). In addition to the
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they concluded that the only effective way to implement the Act's
provisions was through private litigation.1 2 Many of these courts
have reasoned further that redressing prejudicial employment practices through class actions is more efficient than by the more cumbersome method of individual discrimination suits.13 Thus, class
action plaintiffs alleging broad charges of employment discrimination have been permitted to challenge every discriminatory employment practice of an employer, although the named plaintiffs have
been injured by only one particular practice. 4 This approach,
widely known by the term "across-the-board," enables plaintiffs
aggrieved by an allegedly discriminatory discharge, for example, to
represent not only other discharged employees but also employees
allegedly discriminated against by the employer's hiring, job assignment, promotion, seniority, and discipline systems. 5 Similarly, former employees have been allowed to represent past, present, and
future employees, whose allegations of employment discrimination
necessarily would differ from those of the plaintiff.1 6
The development of the across-the-board approach has resulted
in a superficial analysis of the requirements of Rule 23(a) by some
failure of the EEOC to develop a "vigorous and orderly system for rooting out patterns and
practices of employment discrimination," the subcommittee characterized the EEOC's litigation and compliance activities as "weak . . . largely ineffective [and] . . . poorly coordinated." Id.
12: See 4 H. NEWBERG, supranote 5, § 7973a, at 1268. Although a Title VII plaintiff's access
to the courts is restricted by such requirements as that his complaint first must be filed with
the EEOC, "this does not minimize the role of ostensibly private litigation in effectuating
the congressional policies. To the contrary, this magnifies its importance while at the same
time utilizing the powerful catalyst of conciliation through EEOC." Jenkins v. United Gas
Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32 (5th Cir. 1968).
Prior to Title VII's 1972 amendments providing enforcement authority to the EEOC, courts
were more justified in permitting broadly-framed private actions because enforcement was
limited, as a practical matter, to private individuals. The Department of Justice was the only
governmental agency charged with enforcing the Act by seldom-used "pattern and practice"
suits. Hence, private individuals were permitted to vindicate the public interest as "private
attorney generals." See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir.
1969); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968); Jenkins v. United
Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 n.10 (5th Cir. 1968). Courts have not re-examined this concept,
however, since the EEOC's acquisition of enforcement power.
13. See 4 H. NEWBE G, supra note 5, §§ 7973a, 7984, at 1301.
14. See id. § 7973b.
15. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969)
(error to allow a discharged employee to represent only other discharged employees); Janofsky, supra note 10, at 325; cases cited note 38 infra.
16. Some courts have permitted rejected applicants to represent a class of the defendant
employer's present employees. See, e.g., Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc., 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir.
1970).
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courts, which have adopted the view that employment discrimination suits by definition are class actions'7 because the evil sought to
be eliminated is typically class-oriented.' 8 A danger inherent in substituting this conclusory approach for a thorough analysis of the
named plaintiffs' allegations, however, is that the procedural prerequisites of Rule 23 tend to be ignored completely rather than merely
relaxed or applied liberally and that the broad res judicata effects
of a class action certification consequently are overlooked. One
writer even has suggested that the procedural "obstacles" and
"technicalities" of the rule are superfluous and should be disregarded in the Title VII context so as to effectuate congressional
intent. 9
Confronted with inconsistent lower court rulings regarding the
applicability of Rule 23(a)'s requirements, the United States Supreme Court undertook review of a class certification order issued
by the Fifth Circuit. In East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v.
Rodriguez"0 the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's ruling
and reinstated the findings of the district court that the named
plaintiffs' class claims were without merit because "it was evident
by the time the case reached that court that the named plaintiffs
were not proper class representatives [inasmuch as they] were not
members of the class of discriminatees they purported to repre17. See, e.g., Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 1969)
("Discriminiation on the basis of race or sex is class discrimination.");Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968) ("Racial discrimination is by definition class
discrimination .... ");McLendon v. M. David Lowe Personnel Servs. Inc., 15 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 245, 247 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D.
Tenn. 1966) ("Racial discrimination is by definition a class discrimination. If it exists, it
applies throughout the class."); 3B MooRE's, supra note 10,
23.10-1, at 23-2762 & n.4;
Classwide Discrimination,supranote 6, at 392.
18. See note 4 supra. One commentator has stated: "Title VII discrimination is classwide
discrimination because the operation of a discriminatory employment policy against an individual necessarily presents a question common to all persons possessing the class characteristic that precipitated the employer's unlawful action." Classwide Discrimination,supranote
6, at 392. In Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), the leading case
espousing this view, the court stated: "A suit for violation of Title VII is necessarily a class
action as the evil sought to be ended is discrimination on the basis of a class characteristic
[such as] race, sex, religion or national origin." Id. at 719. The Courts of Appeals for the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits also have adopted this position. See Parham v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 428 (8th Cir. 1970); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462, 468
(5th Cir. 1969); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968).
19. See Classwide Discrimination,supra note 6, at 408.
20. 431 U.S. 395 (1977). For a discussion of Rodriguez, see notes 120-30 infra& accompanying text.
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sent."'2' Referring implicitly to Rule 23(a)'s requirements of typicality and commonality, the Court in Rodriguez reiterated its position
that "a class representative must be part of the class and 'possess
the same interest and suffer the same injury' as the class mem22
bers."
Although the scope of Rodriguez is uncertain because of its highly
atypical facts, the Court clearly rejected an unrestrained application of the across-the-board approach:
We are not unaware that suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often by their very nature class suits, involving classwide wrongs. Common questions of law or fact are typically present. But careful attention to the requirementsof Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 23 remains nonetheless indispensable. The mere fact that
a complaint alleges racial or ethnic discrimination does not in
itself ensure that the party who has brought the lawsuit will be
an adequate representative of those who may have been the real
victims of that discrimination."
To assess the impact of Rodriguez on future developments in the
law, this Article undertakes an investigation of the background and
development of both the broad and restrictive applications of Rule
23(a) in Title VII litigation. After identifying the differences in each
approach, the Article then attempts to trEice the development and
to identify the current status of the law pertaining to the certification of Title VII class action suits in the Fourth Circuit.
ACROSS-THE-BOARD CLASS ALLEGATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION

An early leading case approving the across-the-board approach to
class action suits was Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,24
in which a discharged employee sought to attack on behalf of all
black employees all the defendant's allegedly discriminatory practices. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court improperly narrowed the scope of the Title VII class action to persons discharged
by the defendant. 25 The court of appeals determined that the named
21. Id. at 403.
22. Id. (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216
(1974)).
23. 431 U.S. at 405-06 (emphasis supplied).
24. 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
25. Id. at 1124.
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plaintiffs across-the-board attack on the defendant's employment
practices challenged a system-wide policy of racial discrimination,
and it permitted the named plaintiff to seek relief against any rule,
2
regulation, custom, or practice having a discriminatory effect. 1
As a result of this ruling, Title VII plaintiffs have been allowed
to attack all of an employer's allegedly discriminatory policies on
behalf of other protected individuals, although the representative
plaintiff was aggrieved by only one of the employer's practices.2
Across-the-board challenges have been sustained by the Fourth,2
Fifth,'2 9 Sixth,30 Eighth, 31 and Tenth 32 Circuits. 33 The Fifth Circuit,
however, has contributed most to the development of this form of
34
relief to rectify employment discrimination.
The widespread adoption of the across-the-board approach often
resulted in courts routinely certifying classes simply on the basis of
an allegation of pervasive employment discrimination, with little or
no discussion of Rule 23(a)'s procedural prerequisites.3 5 Thus, gen26. Id.
27. See, e.g., McLendon v. M. David Lowe Personnel Servs. Inc., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
245 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (rejected applicants permitted to represent other Mexican-Americans
and blacks who were employed or who might either seek or actually receive future employment); Walker v. Styrex Indus., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 274 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (discharged
blacks allowed to represent all blacks who either have been or might be affected by defendant's unlawful employment policies). Both McLendon and Walker deemed unnecessary the
requirement that the named plaintiff be affected adversely by each challenged employment
practice pursuant to which he brings a class action claim on behalf of other injured employees.
See also Blake v. Los Angeles, 435 F. Supp. 55 (C.D. Cal. 1977). But see Oatis v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968) (plaintiff's class action claims limited to those
practices affecting him personally).
28. See, e.g., Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975).
29. See, e.g., Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
30. See, e.g., Afro Ameican Patrolmen's League v. Duck, 503 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1974);
Tipler v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971).
31. See, e.g., Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
854 (1973); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
32. Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975).
33. For additional cases adopting and rejecting the across-the-board approach, see 3B
MOORE'S, supra note 10, $ 23.06-1, at 23-303 (Supp. 1977-78). In Taylor v. Vocational Rehabilitation Center, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 452, 455 (W.D. Pa. 1976), a Pennsylvania district
court adopted the approach while noting the Third Circuit's silence on the subject.
34. Recognizing the Fifth Circuit's sensitivity to the often subtle manifestations of employment discrimination, the court in Mack v. General Elec. Co., 329 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1971),
considered that court of appeals the most expeienced and most qualified tribunal to remedy
Title VII violations through such means as across-the-board relief. Id. at 74-76.
35. See, e.g., Hill v. Singing Hills Funeral Home, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 151 (N.D. Tex.
1978); McLendon v. M. David Lowe Personnel Servs. Inc., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 245 (S.D.
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eral allegations of sexual or racial employment discrimination have
been held sufficient to satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements" and to permit the named plaintiff, although adversely
affected by only one employment practice, to represent a class consisting of all persons affected by the employer's racially or sexually
discriminatory policies. 37 In Scott v. University of Delaware,38 for
example, a black sociology professor, whose contract was not renewed, was allowed to represent a class of blacks affected by the
defendant's allegedly discriminatory recruitment, hiring, promotion, wage, supervision, and discharge policies. In support of its
decision, the court merely stated than an individual suffering employment discrimination because of his race was an adequate representative of other victims of the defendant's racially discriminatory
practices, regardless of the manner in which he or the others had
been injured. 3 The plaintiff ultimately was permitted to represent
a class consisting of the past, present, and future black employees."
In Lamphere v. Brown University4' a female assistant professor of
anthropology, who was denied tenure and a promotion, filed a Title
VII class action on behalf of all past, present, and future female
Tex. 1977); Walker v. Styrex Indus., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 274 (M.D.N.C. 1976); Jones
v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 385 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1975); note 27 supra.See also
cases cited notes 36-37 infra.
36. Harris v. Anaconda Alum. Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 181 (N.D. Ga. 1978). See also
Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 71 F.R.D. 34 (E.D. Pa. 1976), in which the court concluded
that an across-the-board allegation of permeating employment discrimination on the basis
of sex satisfied both the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a). Accordingly,
the court allowed the plaintiff-teacher with a sex discrimination complaint based on the
college's failure to renew her contract to represent women allegedly aggrieved by policies
regarding hiring, recruitment, discharge, promotion, wages, and job assignment.
37. See, e.g., Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., .518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975) (black employee who
was denied promotion allowed to represent blacks allegedly discriminated against by the
defendant's other employment practices); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417
F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969) (discharged black employee could represent other black employees
injured by defendant's hiring, firing, promotion, and other allegedly discriminatory practices); Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 71 F.R.D. 34 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (female plaintiff who
was denied reappointment permitted to represent women allegedly discriminated against by
the defendant's recruitment, hiring, job assignment, promotion, compensation, and termination policies). But see Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff only allowed to represent other blacks employed in the warehouse in which he previously
worked); White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo. 1971) (discharged plaintiff
could represent only those other employees discharged because of their race or color).
38. 68 F.R.D. 606 (D. Del. 1975).
39. See id. at 608.
40. Id.
41. 71 F.R.D. 641 (D.R.I. 1976).
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faculty members throughout the university. Although the defendant
argued that the plaintiff could not represent female faculty members in other departments or who allegedly were injured by the
university's decisions relating to hiring or promotion at non-tenured
levels, the court rejected this view. Instead, it accepted the plaintiffs argument than an across-the-board allegation of sex discrimination was sufficiently common and typical of other types of employment discrimination claims based on sex to enable her to represent other women who might have suffered from differing manifestations of the single policy of discrimination. 2 Thus, the court allowed the plaintiff not only to challenge allegedly discriminatory
policies not affecting her but also to cross departmental lines and
to represent rejected applicants as well as past, present, and future
4
employees. 1
The court in Lamphere noted that no court of appeals had expressly rejected the across-the-board approach, although several
district courts had either refused or failed to adopt it. 4 Nevertheless, the requirements of Rule 23(a) remain, despite the tendency
of some courts using this approach to overlook them. Although some
courts confronted with allegations of pervasive employment discrimination apparently do not undertake any examination of the
Rule's procedural prerequisites, at least a perfunctory analysis is
discernible among other courts that have certified broad-based class
actions under Title VII. An analysis of how these latter cases have
treated Rule 23(a) follows.
42. See id. at 647. Although the court permitted the plaintiff to represent women in other
departments who were the alleged victims of the university's discrimination, it nevertheless
acknowledged cases such as Knox v. Meat Cutters, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1327 (E.D. La.
1975), in which another court had declined to certify an interdepartmental class action
because the claims of the named plaintiff lacked a sufficient nexus with those of class members in other departments. The court in Lamphere explained, however, that '".nexus is a
matter depending on the facts and circumstances presented in each case' and that those
cases failing to certify classes consisting of employees from various departments were distinguishable from the present situation. 71 F.R.D. at 647 (quoting 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at
1330). See also Sanday v. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 562 (W.D. Pa.
1976), in which the court distinguished a university from a centrally-managed corporation in
that decisions by university officials were not always made pursuant to a centralized, uniform
policy.
43. 71 F.R.D. at 651.
44. Id. at 645 n.5.
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Judicial Treatment of the Requirements of Rule 23(a) by Courts
Adopting the Across-the-BoardApproach
(1)

Numerosity

As defined in Rule 23(a)(1), numerosity refers to a class "so numerous that joinder of all [its] members is impracticable."4' 5 Because the rule does not list a specified number of class members,
however, application of this prerequisite has been inconsistent, and
the results have been divergent particularly when potential class
members number between ten and one hundred." Subjective judgments by courts as to whether a specific number of potential class
members would make joinder impractical have caused these mixed
decisions and have provided little guidance to potential class representatives contending with Rule 23(a) (1)'s requirement of numerosity. 47
Nevertheless, a few courts have attempted to analyze whether the
numerosity requirement has been met in a given case.48 Some guide45. FED.R. Clv. P. 23(a)(1).
46. In the following cases, the class was sufficiently numerous to satisfy the requirement:
Arkansas Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 446 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1971) (approximately 17 class
members); Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th
Cir. 1967) (18 in race discrimination case); Taylor v. Vocational Rehabilitation Center, 13
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 452 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (minimum of 45 in sex discrimination case);
Hoston v. United States Gypsum Co., 67 F.R.D. 650 (E.D. La. 1975) (56 in race discrimination case); Watson v. City of New Orleans, 12 Fair Empl. Prac Cas. 1625 (E.D. La. 1974) (78
in race discrimination case); Tippett v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 11 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 1289 (M.D.N.C. 1973) (22 in sex discrimination case); Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc.,
362 F. Supp. 1142 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (26 in race discrimination case).
Other courts, however, when presented with potential classes within this same range have
denied class certification. See, e.g., Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1976) (53 in
race discrimination case); Moore v. Consolidation Coal Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 305
(E.D. Tenn. 1976) (13 female applicants for employment); Bowen v. Banquet Foods Corp.,
12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1345 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (14 women challenging company's maternity
policies); Carey v. Greyhound Bus Co., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1403 (E.D. La. 1975) (24-26
employees challenging seniority system as racially discriminatory); Dawkins v. Nabisco, Inc.,
5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1374 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (10 in race discrimination case); Berg v.
Richmond Unified School Dist., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1278 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (12 women
in pregnancy benefits case); Tolbert v. Western Elec. Co., 56 F.R.D. 108 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (11
in race and sex discrimination case).
47. Some courts have decided the numerosity issue merely on the basis of the number of
members potentially belonging to the class. See, e.g., Hoston v. United States Gypsum Co.,
67 F.R.D. 650 (E.D. La. 1975); Bowen v. Banquet Foods Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1345
(E.D. Mo. 1975); Watson v. City of New Orleans, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1625 (E.D. La.
1974); Dawkins v. Nabisco, Inc., 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1374 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Tippett v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1289 (M.D.N.C. 1973).
48. As the number of class members decreases, the courts, before granting class certification, usually place greater reliance on the plaintiff's satisfaction of the other requirements of
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lines were provided by Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc.,4" in which
the District Court for the Southern District of Texas suggested the
following factors as relevant in determining whether the joinder of
all class members is impracticable-"the expediency of the joinder
of all the potential plaintiffs, the inconvenience of trying individual
suits, and the ability of
the individual litigants to institute an action
50
on their own behalf."
(2) Commonality
Interpretations of Rule 23(a)(2)'s requirement that "there are
questions of law or fact common to the class,"'5 similar to the judi-

cial treatment of numerosity, have lacked uniformity.52 Because nei53
ther the rule nor the accompanying Advisory Committee Note
specify the degree of the similarity required among class members'
claims to present a common question, 4 inconsistent results are inevitable. 55 When presented with an across-the-board attack on an
employer's policies, some courts simply have avoided analyzing this
issue,5 concluding instead that such a challenge necessarily raises
common questions of law or fact.57 Moreover, this element of Rule
Rule 23(a). Exemplifying this approach is Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian
Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967), in which the court noted: "No specified number is

needed to maintain a class action under FED. R. Civ. P. 23; application of the rule is to be
considered in light of the particular circumstances of the case and generally, unless abuse is
shown, the trial court's decision on this issue is final." Id. at 653; accord, Carey v. Greyhound
Bus Co., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1403 (E.D. La. 1975); Tolbert v. Western Elec. Co., 56
F.R.D. 108 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
49. 362 F. Supp. 1142 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
50. Id. at 1147; accord, Advertising Special Nat'l Ass'n v. FTC, 238 F.2d 108, 119 (1st Cir.
1958) ("'Impracticability' does not mean 'impossibility,' but only the difficulty or inconvenience of joining all members of the class.").
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
52. See 4 H. NEWaRG, supra note 5, § 7980, at 1290. See generally 3B MOORE'S, supra note
10, 123.06-1 (2d ed. 1974 & Supp. 1977-78).
53. See Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98 (1966).
54. See Developments in the Law - Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1318, 1454 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
55. See Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98 (1966), which states: "In practice, the terms
'joint,' [and] 'common," . . . which were used as the basis of the Rule 23 classification
proved obscure and uncertain . .

.

. The courts had considerable difficulty with these

terms." Id.
56. See 3B MooRE's, supra note 10, T 23.06-1; 4 H. NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 7980.
57. See, e.g., Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975); Barnett v. W.T.
Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d
1122 (5th Cir. 1969); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968);
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23(a) arguably is superfluous because the existence of common
questions is an implicit factor in the four alternative requirements
of Rule 23(b), one of which also must be satisfied before a class
action will be certified."
Even among courts adhering to a liberal application of Rule
23(a)'s tests, however, a perfunctory analysis of commonality generally is made, but the inquiry has been simply whether the representative plaintiff's claims have some aspect or feature in common with
those of the other class members.-9 Allegations of employment discrimination on the basis of sex" or race" have been held adequate
to satisfy this lenient standard. Obviously, adopting this approach
obviates the necessity of examining the employer's different practices to determine the similarities between individual class members' claims and those of the named plaintiff.
In Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,12 however, the
Pendleton v. Schlesinger, 73 F.R.D. 506 (D.D.C. 1977); Alaniz v. California Food Processors,
Inc., 73 F.R.D. 269 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 71 F.R.D. 34 (E.D.
Pa. 1976).
58. See 3B MOORE's, supra note 10, 23.06-1, at 23-301; 4 H. NEWBERG, supra note 5, §
7980; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MiLER, supranote 1, § 1763, at 609-10.
59. These cases hold that Rule 23(a)(2) does not require that the plaintiff's claims mirror
completely those of the class; rather his complaint must share only some features in common
with those of other class members. Thus, one court has observed:
In passing on commonality, it is not appropriate to examine the likeness or
relation of the several claims of all members of the class and their representatives. The only proper inquiry is, as the language suggests, whether there is some
aspect or feature of the claims which is common to all. In any complaint alleging
across-the-board discrimination, this requirement will be met.
Pendleton v. Schlesinger, 73 F.R.D. 506 (D.D.C. 1977). Other courts, at least implicitly, have
adopted the same standard. See, e.g., Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122
(5th Cir. 1969); Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184 (N.D. Tenn. 1966).
60. See, e.g., Mecklenburg v. Montana State Bd. of Regents, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 462
(D. Mont. 1976) ("the common issue of law and fact is the question of discrimination on the
basis of sex"); Martinez v. Bechtel Corp., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 898 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
(plaintiff's allegations of discrimination raise questions common to members of the class). See
generally 3B MOOR.'S, supranote 10, 23.10-1, at 23-2765 & n.12.
61. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969) in
which the court stated: "While it is true . . . that there are different factual questions with
regard to different employees, it is also true that the 'Damoclean threat of a racially discriminatory policy hangs over the racial class [as] a question of fact common to all members of
the class."' Id. at 1124 (quoting Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn.
1966)). See also Marshall v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 68 F.R.D. 287 (D. Del. 1975); 3B
MOORE'S, supra note 10, 23.10-1, at 23-2765 to 67 & n.12. One writer has concluded that
"individual discrimination because of race is evidence of a policy of discrimination, which
present[s] a common question." Id. at 23-2767 n.12.
62. 74 F.R.D. 24 (N.D. Cal. 1977).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:469

court repudiated the liberal across-the-board approach on the commonality issue. The District Court for the Northern District of California concluded that a representative plaintiff must satisfy the
commonality requirement and that a mere conclusory claim of racial or sexual discrimination was insufficient for this purpose; instead, a demonstration of the existence of specific grounds applicable and common to the entire class was necessary." The court specified several criteria relevant to its inquiry: (1) Is the nature of the
alleged unlawful employment practice one that affects only one or
several employees, or is it one genuinely having a class-wide effect?64
(2) Are the employment practices uniform or diverse? 5 (3) Is the
class membership uniform, or is it diverse?66 (4) Is the nature of the
employer's management organization such that uniform policies are
fostered? 7 (5) Does the time span covered by the allegations justify
the inference "that similar conditions prevailed throughout the
period?" 6
These criteria certainly are pertinent to any determination of
whether common questions of law or fact exist; they should be developed further and applied in other situations. Notwithstanding an
increased reliance on these criteria, general principles governing the
commonality issue still will be difficult to discern because the final
determination turns upon the facts of each case.69 A guideline suggested by Harriss, though, is that class membership should neither
extend beyond "the bounds of the group shown to have been commonly affected; nor should the class be so narrowly drawn as to
exclude others who would clearly be entitled to the same relief were
the plaintiff to prevail."70
63. Id. at 41.
64. Id.
65. Id. Considerations relevant to this determination include:
Size of the work force; number of plants and installetions involved; extent of
diversity of employment conditions, occupations and work activities; degree of
geographic dispersion of the employees and of intra-company employee transfers
and interchanges; degree of decentralization of administration and supervision
as opposed to the degree of local autonomy.

Id.
66. Id. This criterion should be considered "in terms of the likelihood that the members'
treatment will involve common questions." Id.
67. Id. The degree of centralization is relevant to determining the probability of uniform
employment and personnel practices. Id.

68. Id.
69. See id.
70. Id.
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Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3) mandates that "the claims or defenses of the representative parties [be] typical of the claims or defenses of the
class. ' 7' The perceived overlap between this provision and the other
subsections of Rule 23(a) has led courts to ignore the typicality
requirement completely 2 or to equate it either with the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) (2)13 or with the adequacy of representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) .74 Moreover, as with the commonality requirement, many courts presented with an across-theboard challenge have held that a generalized allegation of discrimination on the basis of sex 5 or race7 establishes that the named
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
72. See, e.g., Pendleton v. Schlesinger, 73 F.R.D. 506, 509 (D.D.C. 1977); 7 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, supra note 1, § 1764, at 612.
73. See, e.g., Piva v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 378, 385 (N.D. Cal. 1975) ("commonality and
typicality are so closely related that . . . they will be considered together"). See also Ruhe
v. Philadelphia Inquirer, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1304 (E.D. Pa. 1975); 3B MooRE's, supra
note 10, T 23.06-2, at 23-325; 4 H. NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 7983, at 1297.
74. See, e.g., Women's Comm. for EEO v. NBC, 71 F.R.D. 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)(equating typicality with one of the frequently adopted tests for adequacy of representation, the
court considered whether "the representative parties and the other members of the class have
no interests adverse to each other"); 3B MOORE'S, supra note 10, T 23.06-2, at 23-326; 4 H.
NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 7983, at 1296-97.
75. See, e.g., Women's Comm. for EEO v. NBC, 71 F.R.D. 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("If
women in any position within the companies or unions have been denied opportunities
because they are women, their claims are typical."); Ruhe v. Philadelphia Inquirer, 14 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1304 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
In Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1342 (D.N.J. 1975), the defendant
argued that the plaintiff's claim was atypical because unlike most of the other class members,
she had been an engineer, and because whereas her employment had been terminated, the
other proposed class members were job applicants. Although the court conceded that the
plaintiff's claims "may be viewed as non-typical," it nevertheless certified the suit as a class
action. Id. at 1343. Despite the acknowledged differences between the plaintiff's claims and
those of the other class members, the court concluded that an allegation of general discrimination on the basis of sex satisfied the requirement of typicality. See id. at 1344. Similarly,
in Piva v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 378 (N.D. Cal. 1975), the court permitted the representative
plaintiff to maintain a class action on behalf of other women whose claims as a class were
broader than the plaintiff's individual claims. Id. at 387-88. In support of its decision the
court noted that "the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) and (3)
[should] be liberally applied in order to permit a Title VII plaintiff to challenge employment
practices that are related but not identical to the practices which directly affected the plaintiff individually." Id. at 388.
76. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 1969)
("In this case it is clear that the appellate is a member of the class, i.e., a discharged Negro
employee of the appellee, and his claim of racial discrimination is typical of the claims of
the class."); Richerson v. Fargo, 61 F.R.D. 641, 642-43 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Mack v. General
Elec. Co., 329 F. Supp. 72, 76 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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plaintiffs claims are typical of those of the class. Thus, instead of
comparing the effects of the challenged policies on the representative plaintiff and the class members to determine whether typical
claims in fact are present, these courts have accepted as sufficient
evidence of typicality a mere allegation of discrimination on the
basis of a class characteristic."
Other courts do not emphasize the coextensiveness of the claims
at all; instead, the possibility that the plaintiff and the class members occupy conflicting positions negates typicality. Under this rationale denial of class action status is warranted "when the legal or
factual position of the representatives is markedly different from
that of other members, even though common issues of law or fact
are raised." 8 Most relevant to this inquiry is whether the plaintiff's
interests are significantly antagonistic to those of the class members, such that "the potential for rivalry and conflict within the
class is [so] substantial [as] to jeopardize the interests of class
members." 9 This standard may be applied inappropriately in the
context of the typicality requirement, however, because a determination of the adversity of the plaintiff's claim to those of the class
is an analysis that is encompassed sufficiently by the adequacy of
representation provision of Rule 23(a)(4).1°
(4)

Adequacy of Representation

The imperative of Rule 23(a)(4) that the representative plaintiff
77. "IThe courts have held that typicality is satisfied simply from an allegation of discriminatory treatment against the class, of which the named plaintiff is a member." Ruhe v.
Philadelphia Inquirer, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1304, 1309 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See cases cited
notes 75-76 supra; 4 H. NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 7983.
78. Pendleton v. Schlesinger, 73 F.R.D. 506, 509 (D.D.C. 1977) (quoting 7 C. WRIoHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 1, § 1764, at 614). One treatise has criticized this approach as constituting
a mere restatement of the commonality requirement. According to the treatise, the standard
relates to the "nature of the class and the homogeneity of its claims, rather than to the
characteristics of the claims of the representative party." 3B MooRE's, supra note 10, T
23.06-2, at 64 (Supp. 1977-78).
79. Marshall v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 68 F.R.D. 287, 291-92 (D. Del. 1975); accord,
Kolta v. Tuck Indus., Inc., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 142, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (plaintiff's
claims considered typical when no potential conflict exists between plaintiff and class members).
80. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 1, § 1764. Use of the coextensiveness standard
as a test of typicality, however, is appropriate to buttress a finding of a lack of adversity or
antagonism between the named plaintiff and the class members and thus to add further
assurance that the named representative will represent the class adequately. See id. § 1769,
at 656-57.
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"will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class"'" generally has been interpreted to encompass at least two criteria: first,
the plaintiffs counsel must be competent to conduct the litigation
and must vigorously prosecute the suit, which must not be collusive;
second, the plaintiffs interests must not be antagonistic to those of
the other class members."2 An occasional third criterion enumerated
is that the interests of the representative must be coextensive with
those of the class, an inquiry more appropriate to Rule 23(a)(2) or
(3)813

The first criterion 6ontemplated by the requirement of adequate
representation, that the plaintiffs counsel is qualified and will prosecute the case vigorously, generally is presumed unless the court
is presented with evidence to the contrary.84 Its purpose is to elimi81. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). This subsection has been characterized as "perhaps the most
crucial requirement because the judgment will conclusively determine the rights of absent
members." Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 42 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
82. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 43 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 71 F.R.D. 34, 45
(E.D. Pa. 1976); Cottrell v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 62 F.R.D. 516, 521 (E.D. Va. 1974);
4 H. NEWBERG, supra note 5, §'7984; 7 C. WmoIHT & A. MILLER, supranote 1, § 1765, at 619.
See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975) ("[W]here it is unlikely that segments of
the class appellate represents would have interests conflicting with those she has sought to
advance, and where the interests of that class have been competently urged at each level of
the proceeding, .

.

. the test of Rule 23(a) is met.").

83. See, e.g., Advertising Special Nat'l Ass'n v. FTC, 238 F.2d 108, 119 (1st Cir. 1958).
Interpretations of this standard have varied. A coincidence of interests usually is deemed
sufficient to insure adequate representation. See, e.g., Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 403
(D.R.I. 1977) (quoting Mersay v. First Republic Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1968))
('adequacy of representation' also means that 'the interests of the representative party must
coincide with those of the class"'). See also Cottrell v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 62 F.R.D.
516, 521 (E.D. Va. 1974); Adderly v. Wainwright, 46 F.R.D. 97, 98 (M.D. Fla. 1968). Therefore, although coextensiveness generally does not require that the claims of the representative
and the class members be identical, those parties nevertheless "should share common objectives and legal or factual positions." Fertig v. Blue Cross, 68 F.R.D. 53, 57 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
Other courts, however, have required that the claims of the class representative be identical
to those of the members. See, e.g., Farmers Co-op. Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 133
F.2d 101, 105 (8th Cir. 1942) ("Since in the present case the rights of the plaintiff and of its
stockholders are not identical, it cannot be said that they belong to the same class nor that
the plaintiff can act for them."); cases cited in 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 1, §
1769 n.31 (1972 & Supp. 1977). Basically a duplication of the requirement of typicality, the
coextensiveness of the plaintiff's and the class members' claims more often is analyzed in that
context. See 3B MooRE's, supra note 10, 23.02-3.
84. See 4 H. NEWBERO, supra note 5, § 7984d. In evaluating the competency of counsel,
the court will consider the "personal qualities of counsel, such as sincerity and tenacity,
diligence, and experience and technical competence in the particular type of litigation." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
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nate the possibility of collusion between the plaintiff and the defendant. 5 The issue of vigorous prosecution rarely is raised," but when
it is asserted the plaintiff must sustain only a minimal burden of
proof: he need not show that a majority of the class members authorized the litigation or considered his representation adequate.17
The conflict of interest component of Rule 23(a)(4) is intended to
deny class action status in situations in which the antagonism between the representative and the class is fundamental, such as when
the conflict concerns the subject matter of the suit.8 Courts generally presume a lack of conflict between the representative and the
class members. 9 In addition, if an irreconcilable conflict is manifest, a number of courts have divided the class into subclasses either
before or subsequent to the commencement of the actual litigation
in an attempt to preserve the class action."' Some courts have
treated the standing requirements as a test of the adequacy of representation and have denied representative status to plaintiffs whose
claims were not timely. These courts have insisted only that the
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. "[Tlhe representative party cannot be said to have an affirmative duty to demonstrate that the whole or a majority of the class considers his representation adequate. Nor
can silence be taken as a sign of disapproval." Moss v. Lane Co., 50 F.R.D. 122, 125 (W.D.
Va. 1970) (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)).
88. See, e.g., Arkansas Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 446 F.2d 763, 767 (8th Cir. 1971);
Redmond v. Commerce Trust Co., 144 F.2d 140, 151 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 776
(1944).
89. See 4 H. NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 7984a. To uphold a class designation, doubts often
are resolved in favor of a lack of conflict. See id.
90. See, e.g., Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 45 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
Bryan v. Amrep Corp., 429 F. Supp. 313, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); cf., e.g., Carr v. Conoco
Plastics, Inc., 423 F.2d 57, 58 (5th Cir. 1970) ("[Ilf upon [a] hearing on the merits it appears
that persons who might otherwise be included in this 'class' have an adverse interest to
protect, the trial court can realign the parties."); Hecht v. Cooperative for Am. Relief Everywhere, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 305, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("If the necessity for establishing subclasses of individuals with diverse interests becomes apparent in the future, the court has
power to make appropriate provisions to protect the interests of all."). Other approaches
available in the event of a conflict include limiting the class to individuals whom the plaintiff
would represent adequately, see Bryan v. Amrep Corp., 429 F. Supp. 313, 317 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 414 (D. Colo. 1971), or increasing the
number of named plaintiffs to include others similarly situated and to insure the adequate
representation of the entire class. See Sullivan v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 62 F.R.D.
370, 376 (D.S.C. 1974); First Am. Corp. v. Foster, 51 F.R.D 248, 250 (N.D. Ga. 1970). If fair
representation cannot be achieved, the court may dismiss the class action and still decide
the individual claims. See Duncantell v. Houston, Tex., 333 F. Supp. 973, 974 (S.D. Tex.
1971). See generally 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 1, § 1765, at 623-25 nn.50-54.
91. See, e.g., Jenkins v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1040, 1044 (D. Del. 1973)
(employee discharged 4 12 years prior to suit and not seeking reinstatement had no personal
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named plaintiff and the class members share common legal or factual positions 2 because "[i]f the interests the class representative
is protecting for himself individually are substantially coextensive
with the interests of the members of the class [the] representative
will ordinarily be an adequate protector of the interests of the
9 3

class."

(5)

Requirements of Rule 23(b)

In addition to satisfying the four criteria of Rule 23(a), a suit must
meet one of the three requirements of Rule 23(b) to be certified as
a class action. Rule 23(b) provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
interest in suit's outcome and therefore was an inadequate class representative); Tolbert v.
Danield Constr. Co., 332 F. Supp. 772, 775 (D.S.C. 1971) (because plaintiff had not worked

for defendant within past three years, he could not "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class"). See also Hyatt v. United Aircraft Corp., Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 50 F.R.D.
242, 245 (D. Conn. 1970); 4 H. NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 7984b.
92. See note 83 supra.
93. Newman v. AVCO Corp., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 385, 390 (M.D. Tenn. 1973).
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already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action."

Although most Title VII suits can be certified under either subsection (b)(2) or (b)(3), the overwhelming majority of courts hold that
class action status is appropriate under subsection (b) (2).1 Certification under Rule 23(b) (2) generally is preferable because the judgment will be binding on all class members6 The requirement of
Rule 23(b)(3) that notice be given to all reasonably identifiable
members of a class,97 because it increases tremendously the representative plaintiff's costs,9" further buttresses courts' predilection to
permit the maintenance of class actions under 23(b)(2). Moreover,
courts have reasoned that Title VII suits are particularly amenable
to (b)(2) treatment because "the drafters of Rule 23 specifically
contemplated that suits against discriminatory hiring and promotion policies would be appropriately maintained under (b)(2)."1
The tendency of most courts in Title VII suits to certify class
actions under Rule 23(b)(2), rather than under 23(b)(3), however,
may unfairly bar judicial relief to individuals who have suffered
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
95. See, e.g., Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 525 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 870 (1976) ("Lawsuits alleging classwide discrimination are particularly well suited
for 23(b)(2) treatment since the common claim is susceptible to a single proof and subject to
a single injunctive remedy."). See generally 3B MOORE's, supra note 10, 23.40; 7A C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 1, § 1776.
96. As noted in 3B MooRE's, supra note 10, 23.31[3]:
If an action can be maintained under (b)(1) and/or (b)(2), and also under (b)(3),
the court should order that the suit be maintained as a class action under (b)(1)
and/or (b)(2), rather than under (b)(3), so that the judgment will have res
judicata effect as to all the class. . . and not defeat the policy underlying the
(b)(1) and (b)(2) class suits.
97. Rule 23(c)(2) provides that if a court certifies a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), it
"shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort."
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)( 2 ). Although the giving of notice is mandatory in a Rule 23(b)(3) class
action, the court in its discretion may determine the type of notice necessary in a particular
case. 7A C. WmrHT & A. MILLER, supra note 1, § 1786, at 139-40. Courts in their discretion
also may order notice in a Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) suit. See 3B MooE's, supra note 10,
23.45[1], at 23-704.
98. See 7A C. WmoHT & A. M.LER, supranote 1, § 1786, at 148.
99. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 250 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011
(1975). See also Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125, 130-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98 (1966); Comment, Rule 23: Categoriesof Subsection (b), 10
B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 539, 544 (1969).
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from the same defendant's discriminatory employment practices.
Frivolous suits certified under Rule 23(b)(2) preclude legitimate
discriminatees from suing the employer if the representative plaintiff loses after a full trial on the merits. 0° Theoretically, the more
frivolous the suit, the less difficulty the defendant will have in prevailing through an exposure of the claim's weakness. Thus, broad
class certification is a two-edged sword: it can serve a valuable
remedial and social function in appropriate circunstances, but it
also presents a risk that potentially valid claims subsequently may
be barred. The magnitude of this detrimental effect, of course, increases in direct proportion to the breadth of the class certified.
Although courts should not blindly shift to a more frequent use of
Rule 23(b)(3) to certify Title VII class actions, they should guard
against unfair res judicata effects by exercising great care in certifying broad classes.
(6)

Consequences of Across-the-Board Class Actions

The proliferation of across-the-board cases has caused many
plaintiff's attorneys to perceive any Title VII claim as a potential
class action. For example, a woman may be discharged or assigned
to a different job because a visual handicap impedes her ability to
perform exceedingly minute electronic plant assembly functions.
She could file an across-the-board sex discrimination suit, alleging
that her demotion or termination was a pretext for sex discrimination against her and the defendant's other female employees, applicants, and past employees. Such a tactic would unduly burden the
defendant, who would confront a lawsuit whose dimensions had
been distorted far beyond its true nature as a unique and individual, rather than a systematic, claim. Certain complaints, such as
allegations of a discriminatory pension plan or segregated facilities,
inherently may be of a class nature, even if stated on an individual
basis, and others may fall into a "gray area." Nevertheless, many
purported Title VII class actions originate from individual grievances involving no possible implications of systematic discrimination. Such frivolous class claims should be eliminated early in the
judicial process, certainly before the time of trial and even before
full-scale discovery on the merits has begun. This practice not only
100. See Tolbert v. Western Elec. Co., 56 F.R.D. 108, 114 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62, 68 (D.D.C. 1972).
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would spare defendants from the oppressive burdens associated
with litigating needless class actions, but it also would free the
plaintiffs claim from a class action's procedural complexities and
delays.10'
Several characteristics unique to the class action device operate
to prejudice a defendant's position and to increase the probability
that he will lose on the merits of the case. For example, a class
action will not be dismissed merely because the named plaintiffs
claim is adjudged invalid ' or has become moot.' 3 Moreover, participation in the litigation is not limited to those who have filed timely
charges of employment discrimination with the EEOC: the named
plaintiff may represent other minority group members who allegedly have suffered from employment discrimination, although their
complaints were not the subject of either an EEOC investigation
101. For example, a plaintiff could become unwillingly "locked into" a class action, even
before class certification, in a case that he wished to settle or dismiss. In McArthur v.
Southern Airways, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1123 (5th Cir. 1977), the Fifth Circuit held that
the trial court erred in permitting the plaintiffs, who had initiated their Title VII suit as a
class action, to delete their class claims, although they sought to dismiss those allegations
under FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) before the defendant had filed a responsive pleading. Some form
of notice pursuant to FAD. R. Civ. P. 23(e) had to be given absentee class members prior to
the dismissal or settlement of the proposed class action. 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1127.
102. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1011 (1975); Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973); Reed v. Arlington Hotel
Co., 476 F.2d 721 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973). In Huff the district court found
that the plaintiff, who alleged that he was discriminatorily discharged, was not a proper class
representative because his dismissal resulted from unacceptable performance rather than
from discrimination. The court consequently refused to allow the plaintiff to maintain a class
action on behalf of legitimate discriminatees. 485 F.2d at 712. The Fifth Circuit, however,
asserted that "the standard for determining whether a plaintiff may maintain a class action
is not whether he will ultimately prevail on his claim," and held that the district court erred
in denying class certification to the suit. Id. at 712. According to the court of appeals, the
district court should use its evidentiary hearing on the plaintiff's ability to represent the class
to "find out" about the plaintiff's claim without discovering "too much" about it. Id. at 714.
103. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 754 n.7 (1976) ("Title VII claims
of unnamed class members are not automatically mooted merely because the named representative is determined to be ineligible for relief for reasons peculiar to his individual claim.")
(citations omitted); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975) ("[Ihe controversy may exist,
however, between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named
plaintiff, even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot.").
If the plaintiff could not longer maintain a class action once his claim became moot, the
defendant could defeat all class actions simply by granting the representative plaintiff the
individual relief sought. By preventing the plaintiff from acting as a "private attorney general," such a practice would frustrate the effectuation of the broad social policy underlying
Title VII. See Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32-33 (5th Cir. 1968). See generally
7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 1, § 1776, at 42.
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or conciliation attempt. 4
These conditions, in combination with the success of across-theboard cases, have encouraged the instigation of class action suits

under Title V1I.10 5 Unquestionably, the certification as a class action
of an individual's allegation of discrimination increases the defendant's exposure and thereby adds leverage to the plaintiffs claim.' 6
The sudden and often dramatic increase in the number of plaintiffs
multiplies considerably the potential damage award. Companies
defending class action employment discrimination suits frequently
confront the risk of spectacularly large judgments and awards of
104. See, e.g., Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1968). Recognizing that requiring numerous employees with the same grievance to file individual complaints
with the EEOC would be wasteful, the court in Oatis concluded that permitting one aggrieved
person to file with the EEOC and to bring suit on behalf of those similarly situated would be
more efficient. Id. at 498. This approach, however, apparently conflicts with Title VII's
policy that discriminatees allow their claims under the Act to be the subjects of administrative investigations and conciliation efforts before they resort to litigation. See id. at 497-98;
accord, Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 30 (5th Cir. 1968); Alleman v. T.R.W.,
Inc., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 982, 984 (M.D. Pa. 1974) ("The objective of the EEOC is to
rectify unlawful employment practices without first resorting to civil suits.") (citations
omitted); Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62, 66 (D.D.C. 1972) ("Congress intended that
the EEOC have a chance to investigate informally and hopefully conciliate discrimination
charge

. . .

prior to litigating those charges in Federal Court.").

In Wheeler v. American Home Prods. Corps., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 157 (5th Cir. 1977),
the Fifth Circuit went further to hold that otherwise untimely Title VII claims could be
litigated even in the absence of class action status. The court considered the issue of whether
intervenors in a class action, which later is determined not to be maintainable as such, are
each required to satisfy Title VII's jurisdictional requirements before proceeding on a back
pay claim, or "whether it is sufficient if one of the original plaintiffs had satisfied such
requirements." Id. at 161. The court noted that an individual in a Title VII action must
satisfy two jurisdictional requirements: first, he must file his charge with the EEOC; second,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (1974), he must wait until the EEOC finds reasonable
cause to believe his charge and fails to conciliate with the defendant, dismisses his complaint,
or retains its jurisdiction over the charge for more than 180 days. Members of a class action,
however, need not comply with these jurisdictional prerequisites to receive a back pay
award or injunctive relief. Relying on the congressional intent that back pay should be
awarded to eliminate pervasive discrimination, the court failed to discern any rationale that
could justify the awarding of back pay to class members while denying that relief to intervenors in situations when neither group had complied with the statutory jurisdictional requirements. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 162. Accordingly, the court permitted the intervenors to
assert their claims for back pay, although they had not filed charges with the EEOC. Id.
105. By far the greatest number of class actions brought in the federal courts in recent years
have been civil rights suits. Of the 12,016 class action suits brought during the fiscal years
1973-1976, 6,137 were civil rights class actions. See [1974, 1975, 1976] DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES Couu'rs ANN.

REPS. The percentage increase in

civil rights class action suits from 1975 to 1976 was 17.1%. See [1976] DIRECTOR
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CouRT ANN. REP.

106. See H.

NEWBERG,

supra note 5,, § 1214.
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attorneys' fees.107 Substantial legal fees will be generated regardless
of the disposition of the case.0 8 Thus, the considerations in defending a Title VII class action are somewhat different from those in
defending many other types of lawsuits. The defendant's realistic
objective is not to win at any expense but, rather, to minimize its
own short-term legal, clerical, administrative, and executive costs'
107. Awards of attorneys' fees in class action suits often are huge in comparison to the
usually nominal damage awards received by the individual class members. See Developments
in the Law, supra note 54, 1604 & n.111. In one private antitrust treble-damages class action,
attorneys were awarded over five million dollars. See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am.
Brass Co., 47 F.R.D. 557 (E.D. Pa. 1969). Nearly $200,000 was awarded to attorneys in an
action challenging the hiring and promotion practices of the Philadelphia Police Department.
See Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 431 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See also Blank v. Talley
Indus., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (attorneys awarded $1.4 million in securities
fraud class action). See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 54, 1604-09.
108. Despite the provision in § 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 permitting "the court,
in its discretion, [to] allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs," 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k) (1974),
successful defendants rarely have been permitted to recover attorneys' fees. In Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 98 S. Ct. 694 (1978), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier pronouncement that a prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII suit "'should ordinarily recover an
attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.' "Id. at 698
(quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390, U.S. 400, 402 (1968)). The Court, however,
adopted a stricter standard with respect to awards of attorneys' fees to defendants, holding
that a district court could award attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant only if the plaintiff's
action was "frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, even though not brought in
subjective bad faith." 98 S. Ct. at 700. Thus, merely because a plaintif did not prevail on
the merits was insufficient reason to award attorneys' fees to the defendant. Id. at 701.
109. With regard to the administrative nuisance cost necessitated by the complex factual
issues involved in Title VII suits, the liberal across-the-board approach has increased the
defendant's burden in that he must produce information relating to a wide range of employment practices and a large number of employees that often are spread over immense geographical areas. On the filing of a complaint and an answer, the defendant immediately incurs substantial costs for the executive, clerical, administrative, and legal resources he uses
in the compilation and analysis of his employment records for trial preparation. Even if the
defendant prevails on a motion for summary judgment, which rarely occurs in Title VII cases,
his expenses in preparing the motion with its supporting exhibits, affidavits, and depositions,
and of producing documents requested by the plaintiff in discovery proceedings always will
be great. Class actions often are unmanageable because of their size and complexity. As Chief
Judge Lumbard wrote in his dissent to the landmark securities law case of Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S.
156 (1974): "The appropriate action for this Court is to affirm the district court and put an
end to this Frankenstein monster posing as a class action." Id. at 572. A large corporate
defendant thus may incur extensive costs merely to have the suit dismissed before trial, and
this nuisance factor sometimes promotes early settlements of those claims that do not exceed
these expenses.
A court may limit discovery to class issues before it certifies a class action. See, e.g., Doctor
v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 540 F.2d 699, 707 (4th Cir. 1976); Sutton v. Hedwin Corp., 13
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1729, 1733 (D. Md. 1976). This amount of discovery alone, however,
necessitates the production of records relating to a wide range of employment practices.
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as well as to defuse the risk of the substantial long-term costs of an
adverse judgment. Clearly, settlement pressures on the defendant
are great, even when allegations of employment discrimination are
without merit.
The same economic factors motivating employers to settle Title
VII class actions likewise afford advantages to employees and their
attorneys that may be unwarranted in some circumstances. Plaintiffs' attorneys can negotiate settlements, which Include sizeable
fees, for as much as several thousand dollars with a minimal expenditure, often limited to the costs of filing the complaint and
serving voluminous boilerplate interrogatories. This potential bonanza for plaintiffs' attorneys may entice them to reach settlements
that are not in the best interests of the class members, who, because
of their relatively low stake in the action's outcome, generally cannot supervise closely their lawyer's conduct. '
As a result of these economic factors compelling settlement, the
class action device can be abused by disgruntled members of protected classes. An extremely broad across-the-board class action
suit alleging frivolous claims and forcing the employer to settle can
become a weapon of revenge in the hands of dissatisfied employees."' The opportunity for harassment of employers is obvious,,1
and the concomitant possibility of "blackmail"" 3 raises questions of
due process for an employer that merit as careful consideration as
that given to an employee alleging discrimination.
The temptation for employees to instigate Title VII "strike suits"
designed to effect quick settlement is great. Although this possibility, also exists in other types of legal disputes, safeguards typically
110. Class action plaintiffs' attorneys often have a built-in conflict between their best
interests and those of the class members. See Developments in the Law, supra note 54, at
1605.
11. See Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62 (D.D.C. 1972), in which the court expressed
concern that "a disgruntled employee who happens to be black may discover a weapon of
revenge in the form of a major class action suit under Title VII, when the reason for that
employee's discontent stems from causes other than race or sex discrimination." Id. at 68.
See also Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 941 (1st Cir. 1977), in which
the First Circuit noted that defendants have no general right of protection from unnecessary
litigation. Id. at 943.
112. Cf. Cutner v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(filing of unsupported class allegations in hope that wide-scale discovery will reveal evidence
to support charges is abuse of Rule 23).
113. Class actions have been characterized as "a form of legalized blackmail." See Handler, The Shift from Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in Antitrust Suits-The TwentyThird Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 9 (1971).
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have evolved in these other areas to control plaintiffs who intentionally abuse the weaknesses in the system. Stockholder derivative
suits, for example, have been restricted statutorily."' Similar safeguards should be adopted to prevent Title VII class action suits
predicated on frivolous claims. Although Congress has not responded to this issue, courts have begun to recognize the problems
accompanying the certification of across-the-board class actions.'
Consequently, they are scrutinizing more closely claims based
merely on the named plaintiff's conclusory allegations of an employer's discrimination against all past, present, and future members of a protected class by all types of practices and in all of the
employer's locations and departments."'
REJECTION OR LIMITATION OF THE ACROSS-THE-BOARD DOCTRINE

In contrast to the liberal treatment accorded potential Title VII
class action plaintiffs by federal courts adopting the Fifth Circuit's
across-the-board approach, some federal courts have been more restrictive in applying the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and have not

accepted the conclusion that a broad allegation of employment discrimination automatically qualifies a suit as a class action." 7 Although a common characteristic such as race or sex is always present in Title VII suits, widely disparate factual circumstances nevertheless may separate the plaintiff and the proposed class members. Class actions are appropriate when employment practices
such as segregated facilities or a discriminatory job assignment system affect all class members equally; certification of the suit as a
class action may be unjustified, however, when the alleged discrimination affects class members in different ways or in varying de114. Rule 328(b) of the Maryland Rules of Procedure typifies the legislative response to
shareholders' strike suits. If the plaintiffs in a stockholder derivative suit own neither stock
valued at more than $25,000 nor more than five percent of the outstanding shares of any class
of the corporation's stock, they must post security for the reasonable expenses that may be
incurred by the corporation in defending the suit. MD. R. P. 328(b).
115. In addition to the risk of unjustified burdens upon defendants discussed in this section, broad class certification poses substantial res judicata risks for other discriminatees, as
discussed in the preceding section.
116. See ClassAction, supra note 10, at 326 & n.14.
117. See, e.g., Coles v. Blue Cross, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 210 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Valentino
v. United States Postal Serv., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 242 (D.D.C. 1977); cases cited in 3B
MoOmE's, supra note 10, 23.06-1, at 23-303 (Supp. 1977-78); Class Action, supra note 10,
at 328-29.
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grees."8 In recognition of these factors some federal courts have
refused to certify suits in which intra-class differences have rendered the plaintiffs' claims inappropriate for class action treatment."9
The Supreme Court's decision in East Texas Motor FreightSystem, Inc. v. Rodriguez"' seemingly verifies that the approach of
these courts is not an unreasonably-restrictive interpretation of Rule
23(a)'s requirements as applied to Title VII class actions. In
Rodriguez the Court held that the Fifth Circuit erred in certifying
as a class action a Title VII suit brought by three MexicanAmerican truck drivers. 121 The defendant trucking company maintained a policy prohibiting employee transfers from city to line driving jobs. Moreover, the company's collective bargaining agreement
with the union required that seniority be computed only from the
date an employee entered a particular job classification. The plaintiffs alleged that the combined effect of these two policies discriminated against them and black drivers in violation of Title VII. Emphasizing that the requirements of Rule 23(a) must be applied liberally in Title VII cases, the Fifth Circuit had reversed the district
court's dismissal of the class allegations. 122 The court of appeals
certified a class consisting of all the company's black and MexicanAmerican city drivers covered by the pertinent collective bargaining
agreement and of all the black and Mexican-American applicants
for line driver positions. According to the court, East Texas not only
had perpetuated its past discrimination against blacks and
Mexican-American drivers by maintaining the no-transfer rule and
dual seniority rosters, 1" it also had discriminated against blacks and
24
Mexican-Americans in its initial hiring procedures.
The Supreme Court determined that the Fifth Circuit had erred
in certifying this class action and in imposing potential classwide
liability on the company because the named plaintiffs, by the time
the case reached the court of appeals, were not members of the class
they purported to represent and did not "'possess the same interest
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See H. NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 7980, at 1290.
See Developments in the Law, supra note 54, at 1489 & n.189.
431 U.S. 395 (1977).
Id. at 403.
Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc., 505 F.2d 40, 50 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 56.
Id. at 54-55.
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and suffer the same injury' as the class members."' ' The Court
articulated two reasons for its conclusion that the named plaintiffs
lacked a sufficient nexus with the purported class members to represent those who may have suffered the alleged injuries: first, the
three named plaintiffs lacked the qualifications to be hired as line
drivers and, therefore, were not injured by the alleged discriminatory hiring practices;1 21 second, the three plaintiffs stipulated that
they had not been the victims of discrimination with respect to their
initial hiring. Thus, they properly could not attack either the notransfer rule or the seniority system on the ground that such
"practices perpetuated past discrimination and locked minorities
into the less desirable jobs to which they had been discriminatorily
assigned."' In addition to their lack of class membership, two other
factors indicated that the plaintiffs could not represent the class
adequately: the plaintiffs had failed to protect the class members'
interests by not moving for class certification prior to trial, and a
majority of the union's local members had rejected a proposal to
merge the city drivers' and line drivers' seniority lists and to authorize unrestricted transfers between the two jobs.1 28
Although conceding that discrimination suits are often "by their
very nature class suits, involving classwide wrongs,' 29 the Court
cautioned that "careful attention to the requirements of [Rule 23]
remains nonetheless indispensable."' 30 The opinion in Rodriguez
failed to indicate, however, which, if any, of Rule 23(a)'s four requirements provided the basis for the Court's decision that the class
was certified erroneously. Nor did it indicate which, if any, of the
four grounds it discussed would alone warrant a denial of class certification. The only sound inference that can be drawn from the decision is that the Supreme Court has refused to treat Title VII claims
predicated upon bare across-the-board allegations as class actions
automatically and is encouraging the judiciary to analyze closely
the facts of each proposed class action to determine whether they
satisfy Rule 23(a)'s prerequisites.
125. 431 U.S. at 403 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208, 216 (1974)).
126. 431 U.S. at 403.
127. Id. at 404.
128. Id. at 405.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 405-06.
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Even before Rodriguez, a number of federal courts discerning the
existence of intra-class differences had engaged in the type of strict
scrutiny later sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Some of these
courts predicated their denials of class action certification on the
lack of typicality between the plaintiffs' claims and those of the
potential class members;131 others held that the plaintiff was an
inadequate representative of the proposed class.1r The lack of common questions of law or fact provided another reason for courts to
1
decline certification to proposed class actions. 3
Although courts refusing to follow the across-the-board doctrine
have deemed various sections of Rule 23(a) unsatisfied, the determinative factor warranting a denial of class action status ultimately
is the existence of sufficient intra-class differences to destroy the
requisite community of interest between the plaintiff and the
class. 34 The degree of difference among claims sufficient to justify
a denial of class certification varies among courts,rs however, making generalizations impossible. Clearly, under this approach plaintiffs must demonstrate more than is required by courts adopting the
across-the-board doctrine; mere membership in a protected class
and an alleged injury by an employment practice is insufficient to
warrant the inclusion of other classes of grievances in the action.
Although not requiring an absolute identity of claims, this stricter
approach requires a showing of a reasonably coextensive interest
between the representative plaintiffs claims and those of the proposed class.'36 Absent such proof, courts adopting this approach
131. See, e.g., Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975); White v. Gates

Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 415 (D. Colo. 1971).
132. See, e.g., Hyatt v. United Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 242 (D. Conn. 1970). See also
Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring, 443 F. Supp. 899 (M.D. La. 1978), a post-Rodriguez case in which
the court reversed a decision requiring the merger of two unions when its subsequently
determined that the individuals who brought the suit had not suffered from any discrimination. Id. at 902.
133. See, e.g., Hyatt v. United Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 242 (D. Conn. 1970); 4 H.
NEWBERG, supranote 5, § 7980, at 1290. Commonality is evident when the challenged action
affects all members of the purported class in the same manner, whereas commonality is more
difficult to ascertain when the alleged discrimination affects the class members differently.
See id.
134. See Developments in the Law, supra note 54, at 1489.
135. See id.

136. See 4 H. NEWBERG, supranote 5, § 7980, at 1293; § 7983, aV1298, 1300. Coextensiveness
"may be satisfied even though varying fact patterns support the claims or defenses of individual class members or there is a disparity in the damages claimed by the representative parties
and other members of the class." Id. § 7983, at 1300.
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either will reject a request for class certification or, alternatively,
will restrict the class until the required coextensiveness prevails
among its remaining members.
Standing
Whenever a Title VII plaintiff contemplates broadening his employment discrimination suit into a class action, he must convince
the court that he is a proper class representative under Rule 23. An
additional prerequisite to the maintenance of the plaintiff's class
action, however, is that he be a member of the class he purports to
represent. 37 This is tantamount to an individual standing requirement,"Ir a threshold determination that must be made before a court
will consider the elements of Rule 23(a).13 9 In Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp" ' the Supreme
Court enunciated a two-pronged test for standing: (1) injury in fact
- the plaintiff must have suffered a legally recognizable injury,
economic or otherwise;"' and (2) zone of interest - the plaintiff's
claims must be within the zone of interests protected by the statute
137. See 4 H. NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 7973d. See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403
(1975).
138. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), in which the Court stated: "[If
none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case
or controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other
member of the class." Id. at 494. Relevant to the Supreme Court's determination of a lack of
controversy in O'Shea was the "absence of specific claims of injury as a result of any of the
wrongful practices charged." Id. at 495 n.3. See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402-03 (1975)
("A named plaintiff in a class action must show that the threat of injury . . . is 'real and
immediate,' not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' "); 4 H. NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 7973d.
139. See 4 H. NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 7973d, at 1278. See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393, 403 (1975) (conclusion that plaintiff is a member of class he seeks to represent "does not
automatically establish that [he] is entitled to litigate the interests of the class . . . but it
does shift the focus of examination from the elements of justiciability to the ability of the
named representative to 'fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.' ") (citation
omitted); Pennsylvania v. Glickman, 370 F. Supp. 724, 727 '(W.D. Pa. 1974) (named plaintiff's satisfaction of standing element and of requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) permits
litigation to proceed as class action).
The requirement of standing has been treated as an implied element of adequacy of representation. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 1, § 1761, at 585 & n.9 (1972 & Supp.
1977). In Rodriguez the Supreme Court implicitly sanctioned this interpretation by concluding that the named plaintiffs could not porvide adequate class representation, in part because
they were not members of the class they purported to represent and, therefore, could not have
been injured by the alleged discriminatory practices. See 431 U.S. at 403-04; text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.
140. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
141. Id. at 152.
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or constitutional guarantee."' Assuming that the claims of most
Title VII plaintiffs fall within the zone of interests protected by the
Act, the primary inquiry in assessing standing is whether the named
plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact from every employment practice challenged. For example, although a discriminatory
discharge clearly injures an affected employee and a discriminatory
refusal to hire similarly aggrieves a rejected applicant, a question
nevertheless remains as to whether a discharged employee should
have standing to represent a rejected applicant and, conversely,
whether an applicant should have standing to represent present or
former employees.
The requirement of standing in Title VII suits receives judicial
treatment comparable to that given the explicit elements of Rule
23(a). Courts adopting the across-the-board approach conclude that
a plaintiff has standing to challenge employment practices that did
not affect him personally."' Those courts applying a less abstract
standard for injury in fact, however, may hold that the requirement
of standing is unsatisfied unless the plaintiff is a member of the
class affected by the specific practice challenged."' In Berg v.
Richmond Unified School District,"5 for example, a female employee challenged her employer's pregnancy benefits system in a
class action purporting to represent all female employees who had
or would suffer from the system's discriminatory effects. Although
142. Id. at 153.
143. See, e.g., Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1971); Carr v. Conoco
Plastics, Inc., 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1970); Briggs v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 414
F. Supp. 371 (E.D. Va. 1976). Explicitly addressing the standing issue, the court in
Graniteuilleasserted that a party "may even be aggrieved by employment practices to which
he is not immediately subject." 438 F.2d at 37. Thus the court interpreted injury in fact to
require that a plaintiff suffer only from the more abstract injury of race or sex discrimination
in employment rather than from an injury caused by a specific employment practice, and it
permitted the plaintiff to represent other blacks who might have been injured by the challenged discriminatory practice although the plaintiff did not allege that the practice had
affected him personally. See id. In Carrthe plaintiffs challenged both the defendant's hiring
policies and its internal operations. Reasoning that the rejected applicants might have been
injured by the defendant's discriminatory internal policies, the court upheld the plaintiffs'
standing and permitted them to represent a broad class of employees of which they were not
members. See 423 F.2d at 63-65.
144. See, e.g., Jackson v. Dukakis, 526 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1975); Lightfoot v. Gallo Sales Co.,
15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 615, 618-20 (N.D. Cal. 1977); White v. Nassau County Police Dept.,
15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 266 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). See also cases cited in 3B Moona's, supranote
10, 23.10-1, at 23-2763 n.8. In Jackson the court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to
challenge the defendant's allegedly discriminatory hiring practices because he had never
applied for a job with the defendant and thus could not have suffered any injury in fact. 526
F.2d at 65-66. For a discussion of Lightfoot, see text accompanying notes 211-15 infra.
145. 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1281 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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the district court certified her suit as a class action with prospective
relief, it denied the plaintiff, who had not been pregnant, standing
to seek retroactive relief on behalf of others previously affected by
the system.146
Renewed Vitality for the Typicality Requirement
Although many courts have ignored the typicality requirement of
Rule 23(a)(3) or have equated it either with Rule 23(a)'s commonality or adequacy of representation provisions, 147 some courts have
rejected this trend and have regarded typicality as a separate and
independent test for the maintenance of a class action. 4 ' As the
court in White v. Gates Rubber Co.' 49 stated, typicality "must be
given an independent meaning,"5 0 and requires the plaintiff "to
demonstrate that other members of the class he purports to represent have suffered the same grievances of which he complains."''
Likewise, in Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 5 2 the Tenth Circuit
assumed a position contrary to the Fifth Circuit's across-the-board
approach in Title VII class actions and concluded that Rule 23(a)(3)
requires a comparison of the named plaintiff's claims with those of
the proposed class." 3 Thus, in Taylor the mere assertion of pervasive
employment discrimination was insufficient: the plaintiff had to
prove the existence of a class with similar claims to avoid a dis54
missal of the suit's class action aspects.
The Tenth Circuit in Taylor obviously approved the interpreta146. Id. at 1284.
147. See cases cited in 3B MOORE'S, supra note 10, 23.06-2, at 23-325; 80 DICK L. Rxv.
835, 837 & nn.18-19 (1976). One treatise has asserted that this is the proper approach because
"all meanings attributable to [typicality] duplicate requirements prescribed by other provision in Rule 23." 3B MoORE's supra note 10, 23.06-2, at 23-325.
148. See, e.g., Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975); Peterson v.
Bender Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 602 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Nguyen v. Kissinger, 21 Fed. R.
Serv.2d 528 (N.D. Cal. 1976); White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo. 1971). This
trend is discussed in 80 DICK. L. REv. 835 (1976).
149. 53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo. 1971). For a discussion of White, see 4 H. NEWBERO, supra
note 5, § 7983, at 1299-1300; 80 DICK. L. Rav. 835 (1976).
150. 53 F.R.D. at 415.
151. Id.
152. 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).

153. Id. at 270.
154. See id. The definition of typicality enunciated in White and Taylor has been criticized

for emphasizing the "requirements for a threshold showing of the 'existence of a class,' and
the further requirement to prove the merits of the action before a class will be certified." 4

H. NEWBaG, supra note 5, § 7983, at 1300.

1978]

TITLE VII CLASS ACTION SUITS

tion given Rule 23(a) (3) in White that typicality should be accorded
equal status with the other sections of Rule 23(a).' This conclusion
is reasonable, considering that typicality was formulated as a distinct element by the drafters of Rule 23. Furthermore, the language
of the rule fails to indicate that the typicality provision carries less
weight than the other three subsections of Rule 23(a).1 56
Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.'57 also adopted a
strict standard requiring a plaintiff to satisfy typicality by showing
that his interests are "coextensive with the interest[s] of the entire
class."'' 8 According to the court, coextensiveness meant that the
interests of the plaintiff were aligned squarely with the interests of
the class.'59 Harriss suggested several criteria to be evaluated in a
determination of whether a sufficient community of interest exists
between the plaintiff's claims and those of the class so as to establish typicality:
(i) is plaintiff's situation - his position, occupation, and
terms and conditions of employment - typical of the situation
of those he seeks to represent;
(ii) are the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's grievance
typical of those relating to the claim of the class;
(iii) will the relief sought by plaintiff benefit the class, and is
plaintiff under the circumstances of the case likely to seek to
benefit the class rather than merely himself.6 '
Although Taylor and White attributed an independent meaning
to the typicality requirement, overlap is inevitable among Rule
23(a)'s four subsections, particularly between the typicality and the
adequacy of representation provisions.'' Confusing these two ele155. See Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 242, 245 (D.D.C.
1977); 80 DICK. L. REv. 835, 837 (1976).
156. An axiomatic principle of statutory interpretation is that the clear and unambiguous
language of a statute is to be given its ordinary and customary meaning. See 73 AM. JUR.2d
Statutes § 194 (1974). Furthermore, a statute's drafters are presumed to have included every
part of a statute for a particular purpose. See id. § 250 (1974).
157. 74 F.R.D. 24 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
158. Id. (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)).
159. 74 F.R.D. at 42.
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 270 (10th Cir. 1975) ("lltis
difficult to attach a meaning to (a)(3) that is not included or does not overlap somewhat with
subsection (a)(4)"); Sommers v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n, 66 F.R.D. 581,
587 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (Rule 23(a)(3) and (a)(4)'s requirements overlap considerably but are not
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ments, some courts have found a lack of typicality and therefore
concluded that the plaintiff could not represent the class adequately.'6 2
Inadequacy of Representation
As noted, a showing of standing generally preceeds the plaintiffs
proof regarding compliance with the specific elements of Rule 23.
After a plaintiff has met this threshold requirement, his failure to
satisfy Rule 23(a)(4)'s adequacy of representation test is the most
63
common reason courts refuse to certify Title VII class actions.
This requirement usually is interpreted as encompassing two principal criteria with which an adequate class representative must comply: the plaintiff's attorney must be qualified, experienced, and
must vigorously prosecute the case, which must not be collusive;
furthermore, the plaintiff's interests may not be antagonistic to
those of the other class members.'64
Courts failing to adopt the across-the-board approach, however,
have ascertained additional reasons for concluding that a particular
plaintiff cannot represent the class members adequately. A plaintiff
who grossly has neglected his employment responsibilities, for example, may be deemed an inadequate class representative' 5 because he similarly may disregard the duties accompanying that position. 6 ' Courts also may deny class certification to prospective
plaintiffs who cannot afford the minimal costs of the litigation,' 7
redundant because plaintiffs and class members conceivably could have similar claims without having coextensive interests).
162. See, e.g., Lightfoot v. Gallo Sales Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 615, 620 (N.D. Cal.
1977).
163. See Class Action, supra note 10, at 331.
164. See notes 81-90 supra & accompanying text.
165. See Cobb v. Avon Prods., Inc., 71 F.R.D. 652 (W.D. Pa. 1976); cf. Jones v. Pacific
Intermountain Express, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 359 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (imprisoned plaintiff
cannot adequately represent class).
166. See 71 F.R.D. at 655.
167. See Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1438, 1439 (S.D. Ind.
1975). Because the plaintiff in Wilson could not afford the minimal costs of litigation, his
attorney advanced all the necessary expenses. The court concluded, however, that the attorney could recoup these advances only if the plaintiff recovered a substantial judgment.
Consequently, it refused to permit the plaintiff to maintain a class action on the ground that
he cpuld not represent the class adequately. Id. at 1439; accord, Parker v. Kroger Co., 14 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 75, 83 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (plaintiff's ability to finance litigation is one factor
to be considered in assessing the adequacy of his representation).
To assist them in ascertaining the plaintiff's ability to afford the litigation, courts have
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and an inordinate delay in the prosecution of his suit similarly can
vitiate the plaintiff's ability to represent the class, 68' as demonstrated in Campbell v. Al Thrasher Lumber Co.' 9
Even a potential conflict of interest between the plaintiff and
some class members also may preclude the plaintiff from adequately representing the class. In Social Services Union v. County,'7"
for example, two labor unions were prohibited from bringing charges
alleging wage discrimination on behalf of their female members. A
determinative factor in the court's decision was the potential conflict of interest between the unions, which had negotiated the pay
scales in question, and the female employees. Because the male
union members could have been affected adversely by a successful
suit, the court concluded that the unions were inappropriate representatives of the potential class members.17 1 In Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co.' 72 the conflict of interest was more pronounced. A major-

ity of the class members in Bailey filed a petition stating that the
relief sought was contrary to their interests. As a result of the obvious antagonism between the plaintiffs' claims and the interests
they sought to represent, the court considered the plaintiffs to be
73
inadequate class representatives.

FactorsShowing an Insufficient Community of Interest Between the
Plaintiff and the Proposed Class
Courts often have denied class status, without a specific reference
to or discussion of either standing or the four elements of Rule
ordered disclosure of information concerning the named plaintiff's financial status. See, e.g.,
Rode v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 76 F.R.D. 229 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Guse v. J.C. Penney Co.,
409 F. Supp. 28 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
168. See, e.g., Burns v. Georgia, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1566 (N.D. Ga. 1977); LaFont
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 170 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Lau v. Standard Oil,
70 F.R.D. 526 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Strozier v. General Motors Corp., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
963 (N.D. Ga. 1975). Reasoning that the judiciary must ensure that class actions are brought
"by plaintiffs who, by their own and their chosen counsel's diligence will be able to fairly
represent the desired class," the court in Lau denied class certification because the plaintiffs
failed to prosecute the suit in a timely, diligent manner. 70 F.R.D. at 528.
169. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 189 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
170. 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 570 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
171. See id. at 572-73. The court posited that the matter could be resolved more satisfactorily by private suits. See id.
172. 528 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1976).
173. See id. at 553. In Droughn v. FMC Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 771 (E.D. Pa.
1977), the court held that a black female could not represent a class of black men and all
women, who were the alleged victims of discrimination, because potential conflicts of interest
existed between the two groups. See also Colston v. Maryland Cup Corp., 18 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 83 (D. Md. 1978).
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23(a), when the named plaintiff's employment position did not
have a sufficient community of interest with other job classifications included in the proposed class. Moreover, whether these
other courts have predicated their decisions rejecting the maintainability of across-the-board class actions on the lack of typicality, on the plaintiffs' inadequate representation, or on the absence
of standing is immaterial: the significance of these opinions lies in
the factors deemed determinative by the courts in their conclusions that the plaintiffs' claims and those of the proposed classes
were too dissimilar to merit class action treatment. The following
analysis describes the types of circumstances that have been held
sufficient to destroy the requisite community of interest.
Employees Affected by Different Employment Practices
The common rationale of this group of cases is that a plaintiff
aggrieved by only one type of employment practice or policy has
insufficient experience as to the adverse effects of other practices,
both at his location and at others, to represent adequately employees who might have been injured in different ways. For example, the
court in White v. Gates Rubber Co.' specifically declined to follow
the Fifth Circuit's holding that an across-the-board attack on a
company's employment practices satisfied the requirement of common questions of law or fact, 7 5 asserting that the approach was
"overbroad" and that it substituted a "conclusory accusation for
the actual similarity of grievances which the rule would seem to
require."'' The court thus refused to permit a discharged black
employee to represent a class composed of all blacks and Spanish
surnamed persons allegedly affected by all of the defendant's discriminatory employment practices. 7 A discharged black employee
could not represent appropriately the entire class of minority employees allegedly affected by all aspects of the defendant's employment system, the court determined, because he had no "personal
complaint" other than his discharge. 78 Accordingly, he was permit174. 53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo. 1971).
175. Id.at 413.
176. Id.
177. Id.at 413-14.
178. Id. at 413; cf. Richmond Black Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Richmond, 386 F. Supp.
151 (E.D. Va. 1974) (black policemen suing pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) lacked
standing to maintain class action on behalf of former officers). Many cases have held that a
discharged employee cannot qualify as a class representative for employees who currently are
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ted to represent only a class of black employees allegedly discharged
because of race. Other courts have held that a current employee
could not represent a class of former employees discharged for allegedly racial reasons, because the current employee had not been
affected adversely by the employer's termination policy.' 9
On similar reasoning, some courts have rejected proposed class
actions by present employees who were seeking to represent rejected
applicants or employees affected by other company practices. In
Mason v. Calgon Corp.,'8 for example, a black plaintiff attempted
to bring a class action on behalf of herself and other black employees
against the defendant's discriminatory employment practices. The
plaintiff alleged that the company's failure to provide her with adequate training to'operate the machinery installed to automate her
department ultimately resulted in her failure to be promoted and
in her discharge. Denying certification of the class action, the court
regarded the plaintiff's grievance as not sufficiently typical of
claims of hiring and recruitment discrimination to satisfy the criterion in Rule 23(a)(3).' 8 '
In Anderson v. Southern Pacific TransportationCo.' 2 the court
refused to allow two black employees with promotion grievances to
represent black employees and applicants who were the victims of
the defendant's other allegedly discriminatory employment practices, because their claims were not typical of those of the entire
class. The court determined that, at most, the claims were typical
of those of other blacks who might have been denied promotions to
the positions sought by the two named plaintiffs.'8 3
Employees at Different GeographicalLocations
Some courts have found typicality lacking when the plaintiff and
working for the defendant. See, e.g., Heard v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1972);
Campbell v. Al Thrasher Lumber Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 189 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Jenkins
v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1040 (D. Del. 1973); Forst v. First Nat'l Bank, 5 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 609 (D.D.C. 1972); Tolbert v. Daniel Constr. Co., 332 F. Supp. 772 (D.S.C.
1971); Hyatt v. United Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 242 (D. Conn. 1970); Burney v. North Am.
Rockwell Corp., 302 F. Supp. 86 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
179. See Patterson v. Western Dev. Labs, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 772 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
180. 63 F.R.D. 98 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
181. Id. at 102-06. See also Harris v. Farmbest Foods, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 342 (M.D.
Ala. 1977).
182. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 321 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
183. Id. at 322. See also Palmer v. Rodgers, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 702 (D.D.C. 1975).
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the proposed class members were located at physically separate
facilities. In Taylor the Tenth Circuit held that a black plaintiff
could not represent all other blacks located throughout Colorado
who had been the objects of the defendant's allegedly discriminatory employment practices but could represent only those blacks
employed at the defendant's Denver distribution warehouse.' 4 According to the court, the plaintiff had failed to prove that his complaint of a racially discriminatory discharge was typical of the
injuries received by any employees outside that particular warehouse.1 15 Similarly, the district court in Pizano v. J. C. Penney
Co.' held that rejected black and Mexican-American job applicants who sought to challenge the defendant's hiring practices did
not satisfy the commonality or typicality requirements in a proposed class action encompassing the applicants at all of the defendant's stores. The court limited the suit to similarly-situated
applicants, employees, or former employees at the defendant's
Modesto, California, store.' 7
Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. ,"8provides an example of
a court limiting the potential class in a Title VII suit both in terms
of the members' employment status and their geographic location.
The plaintiff in Smith alleged that he was refused a position as a
mail clerk because he was black and male. Reasoning that other
class members would not have the same or similar grievances as the
named plaintiff, the court held that the typicality requirement had
not been satisfied because the plaintiff complained only of a single
discriminatory act and offered merely conclusory allegations concerning other class members and other employment practices.''
The court indicated that if a class action was maintainable its scope
would be limited to applicants who were refused employment in
clerical positions at the defendant's Atlanta division office. Applicants for such positions at other offices would not be included, nor
would applicants for technical positions."10
184. 524 F.2d at 270-71.
185. Id.
186. 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1322 (E.D. Cal. 1975).
187. Id. at 1324-25. See also Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1438
(S.D. Ind. 1975); Doctor v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 135
(M.D.N.C. 1974), affl'd, 540 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1976).
188. 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 734 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
189. Id. at 739.
190. Id. at 735-36. See also Doninger v. Pacific Nw. Bell, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 316 (9th
Cir. 1977) (geographical dispersion destroys common questions of fact or law); Webb v.
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Insufficient Nexus Among Applicants, Present Employees, and
Former Employees
Numerous cases have held that present employees of a company,
rejected applicants for employment, and former employees did not
have a sufficient community of interest among themselves to enable
them to represent each other in a Title VII class action. The court
in Moore v. Consolidation Coal Co.'9 ' refused to permit a current
employee and a rejected applicant to maintain a class action on
behalf of all female applicants, whether they had been employed or
rejected. The court held that the purported class failed because it
included no more than thirteen members. and because the various
interests of the named plaintiffs potentially were antagonistic with
each other and with the interests of the proposed class.'12 The reluctance of courts to certify classes consisting of present or prospective
employees that are represented by a former employee'93 presumably
arises from the belief that the named plaintiff would provide inadequate representation for the class. In Campbell v. Al ThrasherLumber Co.' 4 the court held that an American Indian who filed his suit
more than three years after his voluntary resignation could not
maintain a class action on behalf of present American Indian employees. The court reasoned that the plaintiff could not represent
fairly and adequately the proposed class within the meaning of Rule
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 805 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (class membership
limited to employees at one plant).
191. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 305 (E.D. Tenn. 1975).
192. Id. at 306-07.
193. See, e.g., Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 468 F.2d 172, 179 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc) (former
employee with no possibility of reinstatement is not a proper representative of prospective or
present employees). See also Heard v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1972). In White v.
Nassau County Police Dept., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 266 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), present and
former policemen were not permitted to represent rejected applicants. The prevailing trend,
however, may be to allow present or former employees to represent all past, present, and
future employees and applicants in an across-the-board attack. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Long v. Sapp, 502
F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir.
1969); Holliday v. Red Ball Motor Freight, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 58 (S.D. Tex. 1977);
Walthall v. Blue Shield, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 626 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Smith v. Union Oil
Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 960 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Martinez v. Bechtel Corp., 21 Fed. R.
Serv.2d 85 (N.D. Cal. 1975); 3B MOORE'S, supra note 10, 23.07, at 23-353 (Supp. 1977-78).
194. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 189 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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23(a) (4)99 partially because of the elapsed time between the plaintiff's employment and the filing of his suit. 9 ' Similarly, in Hyatt
v. United Aircraft Corp.'97 the court refused to permit the named
plaintiff, who had voluntarily terminated his employment with the
defendant over one and one-half years prior to the filing of his complaint, to represent past, present, and future employees. The court
concluded that the representative plaintiff could not protect adequately the interests of the class because he had no personal knowledge of the defendant's present employment policies or of the defendant's policies during the period commencing with his termination.' 8
Unique or Unusual Circumstances of the Plaintiff'sEmployment
Some courts have denied standing to a plaintiff in a proposed
class action because his unique employment circumstances lacked
the requisite nexus with those of the other class members. In Odom
v. United States Homes Corp.99 the court denied standing to a
plaintiff,""0 a highly-trained computer specialist and accountant
who had been discharged from his position as a corporate vicepresident after complaining about company minority policies, purporting to represent a class composed of all present and future employees at the defendant's Stafford, Texas plant. Mere allegations
of race discrimination, according to the court, did not automatically
confer class representative status on a named plaintiff. Similarly,
in McFarland v. Upjohn Co. 1' a black supervisor fired by the defendant after a heated argument with another supervisor sought to
represent a class of past, present, and future black skilled craftsmen
employed by the defendant. Characterizing the suit as a "broad
brush" approach, the court declined certification, noting that the
plaintiff's complaint merely "parroted" the requirements of Rule
23(a) without alleging any facts other than a "very personal and
195. Id. at 190.
196. Id.
197. 50 F.R.D. 242 (D. Conn. 1970).
198. Id. at 245. See also Aiken v. Neiman-Marcus, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 240 (N.D. Tex.
1978); Jenkins v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1040 (D. Del. 1973); Tolbert v. Daniel
Constr. Co., 332 F. Supp. 772 (D.S.C. 1971). See generally 4 H. NEWBERG, supra note 5, §
7984b, at 1305.
199. 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 156 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
200. Id. at 157-58.
201. 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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particularized incident." 20 2
Another example of unique circumstances occurred in Pendleton
v. Schlesinger,23 in which the court denied class certification to two
black male and two black female employees who attempted to represent a class of all past, present, and future employees, applicants,
and potential applicants injured by the discriminatory recruitment
practices of Walter Reed Army Medical Center. The court concluded that the claims of the two female employees, which involved
alleged reprisals stemming from their participation in a protest
against the defendant's employment policies, differed markedly
from those of the proposed class. The plaintiffs consequently failed
to satisfy the typicality requirement. 24
Attempts to Cross DepartmentalLines
Insufficient community of interest has been found to exist
among groups of workers in different departments at an employer's
plant in the absence of any or all of a number of factors, including:
interchange between the two groups, similarity of work duties, common wages and benefits, or common supervision." 5 In the absence
of a sufficient community of interest, some courts have disallowed
the creation of a class across departmental lines200 in situations involving rank and file employees and upper echelon employees,'2 1
202. Id. at 129-30.
203. 73 F.R.D. 506 (D.D.C. 1977).
204. Id. at 509-10. Other courts also have prevented plaintiffs with unique grievances from
representing their proposed classes. See, e.g., Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325
(5th Cir. 1978) (alleged discrimination based on effeminate characteristics of male employee);
Hauck v. Xerox Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 154 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Martinez v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 113 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Gray v. IBEW, 73 F.R.D. 638
(D.D.C. 1977); Fernandez v. Avco Corp., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1004 (D. Conn. 1977);
Martin v. Easton Publishing Co., 73 F.R.D. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
205. This test is similar to that used by the National Labor Relations Board when it holds
hearings to determine the most appropriate composition of a voting unit that will select a
collective bargaining representative. The NLRB's community of interest test considers such
factors as different wages or methods of compensation among employees; different hours of
work; different employment benefits; separate supervision; degree of dissimilar qualifications, training, and skills; infrequency of contact with other employees; differences in work
functions; amount of time spent away from employment situs; and bargaining history. See,
e.g., Olinkraft, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. No. 61, (1969); Kennecott Copper Corp., 176 N.L.R.B. No.
13 (1969); Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. No. 10 (1962).
206. See, e.g., Droughn v. FMC Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 771 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
207. See, e.g., Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 805 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Steur v. IT Continental Baking Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 116 (E.D. Va. 1977);
Lo Re v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 431 F. Supp. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Dickerson v. United
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union members and nonunion"'8 or different union members," 9 and
casual employees and permanent employees.210
For example, the District Court for the Northern District of California denied across-the-board class certification in Lightfoot v.
Gallo Sales Co. 21' when the plaintiffs, black sales representatives of

the defendant, sought to represent all past, present, and future
black employees and applicants in all of the departments allegedly
affected by any of the defendant's discriminatory employment practices. In its analysis of the standing issue, the court placed a strict
' and rejected the inclusion of any
burden of proof on the plaintiffs 12
applicants in the class because none of the named plaintiffs had
been discriminatorily refused employment. 1 3 The court then divided the employees into four subclasses: sales representatives, drivers, warehousemen, and clerical or office personnel. 4 Because different hiring qualifications and employment duties were applicable
States Steel Corp., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1450 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Parker v. Kroger Co., 14
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 75 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Piva v. Xerox Corp., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
1259 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
208. See, e.g., Wells v. Ramsey, Scarlett & Co., 506 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1975); Valentino v.
United States Postal Serv., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 242 (D.D.C. 1977); Robbins v. O'Brien
Corp., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
209. See, e.g., Ford v. United States Steel Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 940 (N.D. Ala.
1977); Parker v. Kroger Co., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 75 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
210. See, e.g., Gibson v. Local 40, ILWU, 543 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1976).
211. 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 615 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
212. Id. at 618.
213. Id. at 619-20.
214. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(4) provides in pertinent part: "When appropriate . . . a class
may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of
this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly." This rule provides a useful mechanism for dividing an across-the-board suit into subclasses, each of which is represented fairly
and adequately by a proper plaintiff. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 1969); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th
Cir. 1968); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 54 F.R.D. 465, 466 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Rios v.
Steamfitter's Local 638, 54 F.R.D. 234, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See generally 3B MooRE's, supra
note 10, 23.65, at 23-1251; 4 H. NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 7980, at 1295. The risk of res
judicata as to class members is diminished if the subclass mechanism is used. Id. § 7984, at
1302; see Dore v. Klepp, 522 F.2d 1369, 1374-75 (5th Cir. 1975). The use of this procedural
device would allow employees in different geographical areas, employees affected by different
employment practices, or employees in substantially different job classifications each to be
represented by a named plaintiff prosecuting the action.
This approach may be viable as a method of accommodating diverse groups of employees
in single class action. Unless each subclass is represented by a named plaintiff who is a
member of that subclass, however, the court must still determine whether the named plaintiffs have a sufficient community of interest with the unrepresented subgroups sought to be
made parties to the litigation so as to avoid an unfair res judicata effect on any of those
groups. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 1, § 1790, at 191-92.
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to each subclass, the plaintiffs, as sales representatives, held unique
positions in the company, and their grievances were not related in
any significant manner to those of employees in the other job classifications. Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs lacked the necessary nexus, or community of interest, to represent any subclass
215
other than their own.
Similarly, in Knox v. Meatcutters, Local P-5912l6 the plaintiffs,
discharged black truck drivers, sought to represent all past, present,
and future black office and clerical employees. Noting that the facts
and circumstances must be examined in each case to resolve the
nexus issue, the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
concluded that because an insufficient nexus existed between the
plaintiffs' claims and those of the office and clerical employees, the
plaintiffs could not represent adequately those employees in a class
action. 2 7 In its opinion, the court characterized the Fifth Circuit's
seminal across-the-board decision, Johnson, as a "policy decision
admonishing district judges not to be over-technical in limiting
classes in Title VII cases," rather than as an inflexible holding requiring courts to certify interdepartmental classes consisting of
21 8
employees having separate factual grievances.
More recently, the District Court for the Northern District of
California, in Peterson v. Albert M. Bender Co.,218 rejected the
defendant's contention that the Fifth Circuit either already had
or should abandon the across-the-board approach, and held that
a female underwriter's claims of sex discrimination were not typical
of the claims of other women employed by the defendant. The majority of the defendant's other women employees were secretaries,
clerks, or similar office personnel, and a sufficient factual nexus
between the plaintiff's claim and those of the proposed class was
lacking. Thus, the plaintiff was permitted to represent only other
220
female underwriters.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 620-21.
11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1327 (E.D. La. 1975).
Id. at 1330.
Id. at 1339.
15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 692 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
Id. at 696-97.
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TITLE VII CLASS ACTIONS AND THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH

CIRCUIT

Similar to other federal district courts and courts of appeals
that have struggled with the conflicting policies of Title VII and
Rule 23, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has had difficulty in identifying the limitations on the across-the-board class
action doctrine. Although it initially was receptive to this broad
approach, this court, albeit through panels of different individual
judges, has perceived that limitations on the doctrine comparable
to those developing in other jurisdictions must be enforced. Four
cases decided by the Fourth Circuit illustrate the evolution of the
across-the-board approach in Title VII class actions.
The court expressly adopted the across-the-board approach in
1975. In Barnett v. W. T. Grant Co.2 21 the plaintiff, a black male
truck terminal employee of the defendant, unsuccessfully sought a
position as an over-the-road driver with the company. After he had
initiated an individual suit alleging discrimination on the basis of
race, Barnett amended his complaint to obtain class action relief on
behalf of all blacks who may have been affected by any discriminatory employment practices of the defendant. 212 The District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina narrowed the class to
include only those unsuccessful applicants for road driving positions, and that class, consisting of five persons, failed to meet the
numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a) (1).223
The Fourth Circuit, however, through a panel of Judges Craven,
Winter, and Butzner, reversed the district court.22 4 The appellate

court characterized the plaintiffs claim as an "'across-the-board'
attack on all discriminatory actions by defendants on the ground 2of
261
race," 2 which conformed to the remedial purposes of Title VII.

The judges reasoned that the lower court's "less charitable view,
under which Barnett could as a class representative challenge only
those specific actions taken by the defendants toward him, would
undercut those purposes.

' 22

That Barnett allegedly had been ag-

221. 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975).
222. Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 396 F. Supp. 327, 335 (W.D.N.C. 1974), rev'd in part, 518
F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975).
223. 396 F. Supp. at 336.
224. 518 F.2d at 548.
225. Id. at 547.
226. Id. at 548.
227. Id.
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grieved by some of the company's discriminatory employment practices demonstrated a sufficient nexus between his claim and those
of the potential class members who suffered from different, although
equally racially motivated, company actions. Furthermore, because
Barnett's interests were not antagonistic to those of any potential
2
class members, he could represent the proposed class adequately.1
One year after Barnett the Fourth Circuit, through a different
panel of judges consisting of retired Supreme Court Justice Clark
and Judges Russell and Widener, established some limitations to
the application of the across-the-board doctrine in Title VII class
2
actions. In Doctor v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad
11 four named
plaintiffs brought a class action suit alleging unlawful racial discrimination by the defendant railroad and several unions. In response to the district court's sua sponte request for information and
a statement on the propriety of class certification, the four plaintiffs
had proposed that they be permitted to represent three classes:
Richard H. Doctor would represent all of the employees in the Conductors' Consolidated Seniority District No. 1 discharged because
of race; Frank W. Davis would represent all of the craft employees
at the Hamlet terminal who had been denied promotion because of
race; and Richard Doctor III and H. D. Goodwin would represent
all of the craft employees at the Hamlet terminal who had been
confined to the lowest positions at Seaboard because of race. 3 ' After
reviewing the interrogatory answers and depositions, the district
court denied certification of all the proposed classes except as to
plaintiff Goodwin, for whom the court certified a conditional class,
which included:
[AIll blacks employed at the Hamlet terminal who belong[ed]
to the firemen and oilers craft and [were] in the positions of
Service Workers, Unskilled or Semi-Skilled workers, and [had]
been "locked-in" or [had] not been promoted because of present
or past racial discrimination. In addition, the class include[d]
all blacks employed at the Hamlet terminal who [had] no craft
affiliation and who [had] sought but [had] been prevented
from entering the firemen and oilers craft because of initial discriminatory hiring in the non-craft position.21
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id.
13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 133 (M.D.N.C. 1974), affl'd, 540 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1976).
See 540 F.2d at 699.
Id. at 703.
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On appeal of the class certification denial the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, stating that the plaintiff's bare
allegations of class status had not satisfied their burden under Rule
23(a) . 2 Stating that a plaintiff must meet all the prerequisites of
Rule 23(a), the court cited the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Taylor
with approval and presumably agreed with the court's recognition
of a separate and independent meaning for the typicality requirement. The court of appeals also approved the method used by the
lower court for determining whether the plaintiffs had met their
burden of establishing a class action. Under that procedure a trial
court would review the pleadings but usually would base its determination on more information than that provided in the complaint
itself. Specifically, the trial judge could permit discovery relative to
the issue of class certification, and if necessary, he could conduct a
preliminary evidentiary hearing. 33 The object of the court's inquiry
during this procedure would be to identify the type or character of
each named plaintiffs alleged injury without reaching the merits of
the claims and then to determine whether the allegations presented
issues of law or fact that were common to class, whether the plaintiffs claims were typical of those of the class members, and whether
the purported class satisfied the numerosity requirement.24 Absent
an abuse of discretion by the trial court in deciding these matters,
its conclusions regarding the maintenance of the class action would
23
not be disturbed on appeal. 1
Pursuant to this procedure the Fourth Circuit first examined the
nature of each plaintiffs claim. Richard H. Doctor's sole complaint,
set forth in the discovery record (principally his deposition), was
that the union did not represent him fairly in processing a discharge
grievance. 3 He made no claim of across-the-board discrimination.
Citing White v. Gates Rubber Co.,2 3 the court concluded that Doctor, who had only a discharge grievance, could not represent properly a class of ninety employees who had other complaints.2s The
court determined that the numerosity and typicality requirements
232.
1974);
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 707. See also Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197, 1200 (6th Cir.
Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc).
540 F.2d at 707.
Id. at 708-09.
Id. at 709. See also Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1973)(en banc).
540 F.2d at 705-06.
53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo. 1971); see text accompanying notes 149-51 supra.
540 F.2d at 709.
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were not satisfied because Doctor was unable to identify any other
employees within his craft possessing similar claims, although he
had the benefit of nearly four years of discovery.2 39 The court also
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
class representative status to Frank W. Davis, who had claimed that
his promotion to a machinist had been delayed because he was
unlawfully denied admission to an apprenticeship program. Like
Doctor, however, Davis could not identify other blacks who were
denied admission to apprentice programs.240 Finally, H. D. Goodwin
and Richard Doctor III alleged that the denial of a right in the
collective bargaining agreement to transfer seniority from one craft
to another constituted illegal discrimination. 21 The court stated
that the enforcement of this senority system possibly could violate
Title VII; nevertheless, to justify class certification "there must be
a representative party who has been personally aggrieved" by the
contested action. 2 2 Inasmuch as the plaintiffs never sought nor
qualified for a transfer to another craft and they never suffered any
loss of seniority by transferring, the court concluded that they were
not "aggrieved" parties entitled to represent a class of employees
who had suffered such a loss. 243 Doctor's "personally aggrieved"
standard apparently limited Barnett's across-the-board approach
practices that a plaintiff
by restricting the types of employment
4
24
could attack in a class action.

The Fourth Circuit again considered the requirements for certification of a Title VII class action in Roman v. ESB, Inc. 2 5 In that
case forty-four named plaintiffs brought an action alleging viola239. Id. See also McAdory.v. Scientific Research Instruments, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 468, 473
(D. Md. 1973); Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 331 F. Supp. 1184, 1185 n.1 (W.D. Pa.
1971), modified and affl'd, 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 970
(1973); Olson v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 301 F. Supp. 1356, 1357 n.1 (D. Minn. 1969).
240. 540 F.2d at 710.
241. Id. at 711. Goodwin and Doctor also complained that they had been denied a promotion from the lowest position in their craft at the Hamlet terminal because of their race, and

Goodwin appealed from the discovery limits imposed by the trial court in its certification of
only a portion of the class sought. The court of appeals noted, however, that, by his own
admission, Goodwin had restricted his class claims geographically to the Hamlet terminal
and that the district court's limitation of discovery to that area was proper. Id. at 710-11.
242. Id. at 711.
243. Id.
244. See also Walker v. World Tire Corp., 563 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1977) (class dismissal
upheld when plaintiff unable to show injury as to promotion and discharge allegations).
245. 550 F.2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1976)(en banc).
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tions of section 1981246 and Title VII and sought to represent all
black employees and officials of ESB, a battery manufacturer. The
alleged discrimination involved the company's hiring, discharge,
layoff, pay, and promotion policies, but the primary thrust of the
suit concerned a grievance over ESB's layoffs.2 47 The district court
determined that the class consisted of only those blacks involved in
the layoffs, rather than of all black employees and applicants,2 8 and
it concluded that the fifty-three identifiable class members did not
that
satisfy the numerosity requirement. 29 The trial court also held
25
ESB had not engaged in illegal employment discrimination.
On appeal, in an en banc decision, the Fourth Circuit noted that
the plaintiffs' main concern was ESB's layoff policy, and it therefore
affirmed the district court's denial of class certification. 5 According
to the appellate court the numerosity requirement was not satisfied
because the suit already had forty-four named plaintiffs, and the
burden of adding the nine other identifiable prospective class members as individual plaintiffs was slight.2 512 Moreover, the district
court had not abused its discretion in limiting the potential class to
those injured by ESB's layoff policy, especially in the absence of any
testimony concerning discriminatory practices other than the layoffs. 253 If a broad class action had been certified, the plaintiffs' continued failure to develop evidence of employment discrimination
not involving layoffs could suggest their inability to provide adequate representation.2 54 In contrast, in a non-class action proceeding, the court of appeals reasoned, the final judgment would have a
res judicata effect only for the forty-four named plaintiffs, and no
issue of adequate class-wide representation would be raised. Further, little prejudice could result from the trial court's dismissal of
the class because any other alleged discriminatory policies very
likely would be of a continuing nature and thus would not be barred
2
by the statute of limitations. 11
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
550 F.2d at 1345-46.
Roman v. ESB, Inc., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1063, 1080 (D.S.C. 1973).
Id.
Id. at 1082.
550 F.2d at 1345.
Id. at 1348.
Id.
Id. at 1355-56.
Id.
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In their dissent in Roman, Judges Winter, Craven, and Butzner,
the panel that decided Barnett, noted that the majority did not
purport to overrule the latter decision, which had permitted a plaintiff to maintain an across-the-board action challenging all of a defendant's unlawful employment practices, although not all such
practices had caused injury to the plaintiff.25 Nevertheless, the dissent observed that the majority deviated from the holding in
Barnett in its affirmance of the district court's refusal to certify a
class encompassing members whose complaints did not correspond
precisely with those of the named plaintiffs.257 The extent of this
deviation, however, is not clear. If the plaintiffs in Roman had submitted evidence both of the existence of discriminatory practices
other than ESB's layoff policy and of their ability to represent adequately the employees injured by those practices, would the majority have reached a different conclusion? If so, the Fourth Circuit still
would recognize across-the-board class actions in Title VII suits as
a vehicle for terminating employment discrimination in appropriate
cases, although it would not certify any such action until a complete
analysis revealed that the suit would satisfy all of Rule 23(a)'s requirements.
In August of 1978, -the Fourth Circuit resolved many of these
unanswered questions in Shelton v. Pargo,Inc. 2 s The defendant in
Shelton had appealed from the district court's ruling that Rule 23
(e) mandated notice of the voluntary dismissal, under Rule 41 (a),
of a class action employment discrimination suit in advance of any
class certification or hearing pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1). The court
of appeals reversed, holding that the district court could, in its
discretion, approve a class action settlement and dismissal without
making a certification determination or giving notice to putative
class members under Rule 23(e), if it was satisfied that there had
been no collusion between the parties or attorneys nor prejudice 2 9
to absent class members.
The final pages of the opinion, decided by a panel consisting of
Chief Judge Haynesworth and Judges Russell and Bryan, contain
256. Id. at 1357 (dissenting opinion).
257. Id. at 1361.
F.2d _ 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1413 (4th Cir. 1978).
258. 259. For example, in Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324
(E.D. Pa. 1967), a case in which the court ordered a proposed compromise settlement held
in abeyance until a determination of class certification could be made under Rule 23(c)(1),
the limitations period would have run out one or two weeks after the filing of the action.
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important dicta clarifying the court's view concerning employment
discrimination class certification. Citing Cohen v. Beneficial Loan
Corp., 6" the court first identified what it characterized as abusive
class action suits brought "not to redress real wrongs, but to realize
upon their nuisance value." 6 ' The court also noted the public policy
in favor of settling such suits, "particularly

.

.

class action suits

26
which are an ever increasing burden to so many Federal Courts""
and attributed this flood of litigation to the practice of many lawyers seeking to obtain monetary leverage over defendants by circulating "boiler plate" complaints containing conclusory class action
allegations.
The court further stated that the early tendency of courts to treat
employment discrimination class certification "somewhat cavalierly" no longer prevailed.26 3 Rather, as the court observed:

Courts have begun to give to class certification questions the care
and attention they deserve and this applies to racial discrimination cases as well as to any other type of class actions. Discrimination cases do not qualify as per se class actions: they must meet
the requirements of 23(c) (1) for class certification the same as
any other type of action and may not be treated as true class
actions merely because they are supported by "boiler plate memoranda laden with self-serving conclusions." Any notion that
such cases do not require the same inquiry with reference to compliance with [Rule] 23 as other types of cases was authoritatively dispelled by the decision in East Texas Motor Freight v.
Rodriguez, [431 U.S.] at 405, in which the Court said that, while
"suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often by their
very nature class suits,

. . .

careful attention to the requirements

of Fed. Rul. Civ. Proc. 23 remains nonetheless indispensable" in
such cases. And that has long been the rule in this Circuit.",
Relying upon its opinion in Doctor, the court in Shelton concluded that trial courts could no longer confine themselves to the
260. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
261. 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1418.
262. Id. at 1422.
263. In arriving at this conclusion, the court specifically rejected arguments proferred by
the plaintiffs, based on two decisions from the Eastern District of Wisconsin certifying broadbased class actions: Rotzenburg v. Neenah Jt. School District, 64 F.R.D. 181 (1974) and
Duncan v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 66 F.R.D. 615 (1975). The court disagreed with
the holdings in those cases on the ground that they were inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's Rodriguez decision. 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1423 n.47.
264. 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1423 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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allegations of the complaint in determining the appropriateness of
certifying lawsuits as class actions. Rather, the court suggested that
trial courts should preliminarily explore the merits of the plaintiffs'
claims before reaching any such decision and, if necessary, encourage the parties to engage in extensive discovery on this issue.
Citing its earlier decision in Roman, the court reiterated its insistence that plaintiffs be barred from representing class interests arising out of conduct by which they were not persohally aggrieved.
Thus, the court in Shelton strictly applied the Supreme Court's
prescriptions in Rodriguez which, as the court noted, "may [have]
sound[ed] the death knell for 'across-the-board' suits in discrimination cases."" 5
Applying these prescriptions to the facts of that case, the court
in Shelton pointed out that since both the named plaintiff and
intervenor were in fact hired by the defendant, they would have
severe problems satisfying the numerosity or typicality tests of Rule
23 (a) if they purported to represent individuals who suffered discrimination from hiring or other policies or practices which never
personally aggrieved the named parties. Thus, those allegations of
the complaint were dismissed insofar as they alleged class-based
claims of employment discrimination.
It is clear from the extensive analysis of Rule 23(a) which appears
in Shelton that the Fourth Circuit has determined to adopt a strict
approach to class action discrimination suits. It is also apparent
that the Fourth Circuit has chosen to interpret the Supreme Court's
Rodriguez decision as imposing significant impediments to class
certification, particularly where the named plaintiff is unable to
claim that he or she has been "personally aggrieved" by the employment practice or policy upon which he or she seeks to support a class
action lawsuit.
CONCLUSION

Persons challenging discriminatory employment practices in violation of Title VII previously have experienced considerable success
in maintaining across-the-board class actions. Emphasizing the
importance of Title VII's remedial purposes, many courts have neglected the procedural requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and have certified broad-based class actions without analyz265. Id. at 1423.
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ing sufficiently the nature of the named representative's claim.
More recently, however, the Fourth Circuit and several other courts
have regarded across-the-board allegations with suspicion and, as a
result, have begun to apply more strictly Rule 23(a)'s individual
requirements in Title VII litigation. Although the extent of these
stricter interpretations necessarily will be determined on an ad hoc
basis, some agreement already exists that such factors as a plaintiffs unique employment status, his separate geographic locaton,
his tenuous relationship with employees in other departments, the
remoteness in time of his complaint in relation to those of other
employees, or the peculiar nature of his Title VII claim tend to
undermine that employee's ability to represent a class adequately.
These elements should be utilized as criteria against which each
Title VII proposed class action is measured, and any case whose
facts exhibit too much disparity between the named plaintiff and
the proposed class members under any one of these tests should be
denied class certification.
Although these judicial analyses have limited blind applications
of the across-the-board approach, they have not nullified the possibility of broad class certifications altogether. Rather, the decisions
have warned prospective plaintiffs that broad allegations of employment discrimination are insufficient to achieve class action certification, which will be granted only after a court specifically has
determined that a proposed suit satisfied all of the requirements of
Rule 23(a). This stricter scrutiny of Rule 23(a)'s prerequisites,
thus, will continue to permit the maintenance of broad class actions in appropriate circumstances while concomitantly minimizing
the danger of unfair res judicata consequences and preventing the
litigation of vexatious and frivolous suits.

